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PUBLIC EDUCATION AND STUDENT PRIVACY: 
APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
DORMITORIES AT PUBLIC COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES 
Bryan R. Lemons 
Every year, thousands of students attend public colleges 
and universities while living in residential facilities provided 
by the institution. Sometimes referred to as dormitories or 
residence halls, a student's room in the facility provides a 
venue for privacy that is often lacking on college campuses. In 
a building where possibly thousands reside, a student's 
dormitory room serves a number of purposes: it provides the 
student a place to relax, eat, sleep, study, and socialize. 
Further, the presence of residence life staff offers opportunities 
and activities that enhance a residential student's educational 
and social development. It also offers a location for students to 
keep their most valued possessions, and provides a 
psychological benefit for students who may be living away from 
parents for the first time. As one court has noted: 
Although few people who have ever resided in a college 
dormitory would favorably compare those living quarters to 
the comfort of a private home, a dormitory room is 'home' to 
large numbers of students who attend universities .... 
Because of the very nature of dormitory life, privacy is a 
commodity hard to come by, however much desired. 1 
Dormitories across the country are different in many ways: 
some house hundreds of students, while others house 
thousands; some are segregated by sex, while others are not; 
some use suites to house students, while others retain the 
familiar barracks-style of living. Regardless of these 
differences, the students living in dormitories at public 
institutions can expect that their privacy rights are still 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. In light of the 
1. Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St. 2d 237, 210 (Ohio 1974). 
31 
32 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW ,JOURNAL [2012 
significant student privacy interests involved, it is critical that 
college and university administrators fully understand a 
student's Constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
Failure to respect these rights may result in the institution and 
its employees being held civilly liable,2 and/or seized evidence 
being suppressed, typically in a criminal case.-' 
In summary, this article seeks to provide insight into the 
current state of the law regarding dormitory searches by 
officials at public institutions of higher education. The first 
section of the article provides a brief overview of the Fourth 
Amendment, while the remammg sections address the 
Amendment's application to dormitory rooms and common 
areas. The issue of searches conducted by Resident Assistants 
is discussed, as arc the various recognized exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.4 
A careful reading of the Fourth Amendment reveals that it 
contains two distinct clauses: "the first protecting the basic 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and 
the second requiring that warrants be particular and supported 
by probable cause."5 Thus, regarding this first clause, "[t]he 
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated 
searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are 
2. Smyth v. Lubbers. :J98 F. Supp. 777, 78,1 (W.D. Mich. 197!i). 
:l. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, !i1·1 U.S. 1, 10 (HJ95) ("The l'xclusionar.v rule 
operatl's as a judicially cn•ated renwdy designl:d to safeguard against fut Ul'l' violations 
of Fourth i\mendnwnt rights through the ntho's gl'nl'ral dl'tl:tTl'nt pffect."): Unitl'd 
Stall'S v. Ll•on, 168 U.S. 1'97, 9](j (19S1) (noting "the l'xclusionary rule is dl'sigtwd to 
dd.l'r policl' misconduct .... "): Elkins v. Unitl•d States, ;l(j1 U.S. 20G. 217 (1 ()()0) ("Its 
purpose is to dder-to compPI n•spl:ct for the constitutional guaranty in tlw onlv 
pffectivl'ly availabll' way-by n•moving the incentivP to disregard it."). 
1. U.S. CONS'I'. amend. IV. 
!i. Payton v. New York, 11fi U.S. G7:l, 581 (1980). 
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unreasonable.''6 This clause is "general and forbids every 
search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or 
known to be offenders as well as the innocent .... "7 The second 
clause mandates that probable cause exist before warrants may 
be issued, and that search warrants particularly describe the 
place to be searched and the things to be seized. These 
requirements collectively serve a critical purpose in our society, 
and the clause itself is intended to: 
prevent[] the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful 
bases of fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all 
general searches. Since before the creation of our government, 
such searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental 
principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions 
or statutes of every State in the Union. . . . The need of 
protection against them is attested alike by history and 
present conditions. The Amendment is to be liberally 
construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective 
enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the rights for 
the protection of which it was adopted. 8 
While there is no absolute prohibition on warrantless 
searches, the Supreme Court has made clear that "searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.''9 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, noting 
that the "resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area 
should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded 
to warrants." 10 
6. Florida v. ,Jimeno, 500 U.S. 218,250 (1991). 
7. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (19:ll). 
8. !d. (intl~rnal citation omitted). 
9. Mincey v. Arizona, 4:17 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quotation omitted); see also 
,Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 11 (1918) ("When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, 
not by a policeman or lg]overnment enforcement agent."). 
10. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965); see also United States v. 
Leon. 168 U.S. 897, 922 (1981) ("Searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require 
any deep inquiry into reasonableness, . . . for a warrant issued by a magistrate 
normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in 
conducting the search.") (internal citations and punctuation omitted); Jones v. United 
States, :J62 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960) ("'n a doubtful case, when the officer does not have 
clearly convincing evidence of the immediate need to search, it is most important that 
resort be had to a warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of the police may be 
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The operation of these two clauses has, over time, resulted 
m the establishment of a number of well-established notions 
that provide the framework within which courts answer Fourth 
Amendment questions. The first, that warrantless searches arc 
per se unreasonable, has already been mentioned. 11 The second, 
which will be discussed more fully below, is that the Fourth 
Amendment "protects people, not places." 12 The application of 
the Fourth Amendment has changed over time, and no longer 
requires a physical intrusion by the government in order for 
there to be a constitutional issue. Instead, "[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected." 13 The third 
notion is that probable cause, standing alone, cannot justify a 
warrantless search. 14 Instead, probable cause must exist in 
conjunction with a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement (e.g., searches incident to arrest). 
When analyzing whether an unreasonable Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred, the first question that must 
be considered is whether a "search" actually took place. If the 
action being scrutinized does not constitute a "search," then the 
Fourth Amendment docs not apply. 15 A "search" occurs when 
the government intrudes upon a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society considers to be objectively reasonablc. 16 
weiglwd by an independent judicial officPr, whose decision, not that of Llw polic<•. ma~· 
govern whl'lhur liberty or privacy is to be invaded."). ouerruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Salvucci. 111-l U.S. 8:3 (1 !JHO). 
11. Katz v. Unit<·d States, :JS!J U.S. :H7, :lG7 (1 \Hi7) ("[S]carclws conduct<•d outsid<• 
tlw judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistr:1tt,, are per Sl' 
unn•asonabiP under the Fourth 1\nwndmunt .... "). 
12. !d. at. :lG1. 
1:3. !d. at :351-52 (citations omitted). 
1 1. .Jom's v. United States, :l5 7 U.S. 1 !J:l, ·1 !J7 (195H) ("It is settiPd doctri1w that 
probable cause for be lid' that curtain artidl•s subj<'ct to seizure are in a dwPIIing cannot 
of itself justify a sParch without a warrant."); 1\gndlo v. United Statt•s. 2(-)!J U.S. 20. :n 
(1 !J2fi) ("Btdid', how<•ver well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwPIIing 
house, furnishes no justification f(>r a search of that plact• without a wanant. 1\nd such 
searches arc held unlawful notwithstanding facts un4twstionably showing probable 
cause."). 
15. Kyllo v. United States, G:l:l U.S. 27. :l:l (2001) ("j/\j Fourth 1\mendnwnt search 
does not occur ... unless the individual manifl'stpd a subjective t•xpPetation of privacy 
in the object of thl' challt•ngl'd search, and socil'ty is willing to recognizP that 
expPctation as rl'asonahle.'') (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
Hi. Katz, :)89 U.S. at :lGl (Harlan, .J., concurring); see also Unitt•d States v. 
Romain. :l!J:i F.:ld G:l, 68 (1st Cir. 20(H) ("Among other limitations, a criminal 
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This has become more commonly known a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy." 17 The test for whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists is two-pronged: first, the 
individual must have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy; and second, that expectation must be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 1x If 
either of these prongs is not met, then the Fourth Amendment 
is not implicated. For example, "conversations in the open 
would not be protected against being overheard, for the 
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be 
unreasonable." 19 
The Supreme Court and various federal courts have 
addressed the issue of where individuals have, and do not have, 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. While such determinations 
are incredibly fact-dependent, it is possible to generally address 
a number of areas where the law is firmly settled. For example, 
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy inside his 
or her body.20 As a result, a "physical intrusion, penetrating 
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."21 However, 
courts have drawn a distinction "between physical evidence 
below the skin as opposed to outside the skin .... "22 Thus, 
while the Fourth Amendment will be implicated by the 
drawing of blood,23 or the removal of a bullet from a suspect's 
body,24 it will not be implicated by actions such as compelling 
voice samples through a grand jury subpoena25 or obtaining 
defendant who wishes to embark upon a Fourth Amendment challenge 'must show that 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched and in relation to the 
items seized'.") (quoting United States v. Aguirre, 8:39 F.2d 851, 856 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
17. See California v. Ciraulo, 176 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth 
Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy."') (citation omitted); Illinois v. Andreas, 46:3 U.S. 765, 771 (198:3) 
("The Fourth Amendml,nt protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than 
simply places."). 
18. !d. 
19. Katz, :189 U.S. at :!61 (Harlan, .J., concurring). 
20. Schmerber v. California, :~84 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) ("Search warrants are 
ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could 
be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned."). 
21. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
22. United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
2:l. Schmerber, :l84 U.S. at 770. 
21. Winston v. Lee, 170 U.S. 75:l, 766 (1985). 
25. United States v. Dionisio, 110 U.S. 1, 8 (197a). 
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handwriting exemplars. 26 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that an individual 
will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of 
the vehicle, at least in those areas of a vehicle not exposed to 
view from the outside.27 This same protection, however, would 
not be extended to the exterior of the vehicle, since the 
"exterior of a car ... is thrust into the public eye, and thus to 
examine it does not constitute a 'search."'2x Additionally, a 
passenger would not be entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection in a vehicle which he or she neither owns, nor leases, 
although the passenger would retain an expectation of privacy 
in any personal items he or she brought into the vehicle with 
them.29 
Additionally, the "Supreme Court has long recognized that 
individuals have an expectation of privacy in closed 
containers," such as briefcases, backpacks, purses, wallets, 
etc.30 However, "for there to be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the contents of [the] container should not be apparent 
without opening."31 Thus, "when a container is 'not closed,' or 
'transparent,' or when its 'distinctive configuration ... 
proclaims its contents,' the container supports no reasonable 
expectation of privacy and the contents can be said to be in 
26. United States v. Mara. <110 U.S. 19.21-22 (HJ7:l). 
27. Nl'W York v. Class, 175 U.S. lOG, 111-IG (191\G) ("Whill' tlw intl'rior of an 
automobill' is not subject to the sarme l'Xpect.ations of privacy that lexist. with n•stwct to 
om·'s home. a car's int.Prior as a whole is nonct.hell'ss subject to Fourth Anwndnwnt 
protection from unreasonahlP intrusions by thl' police."); Texas v. Brown, ·1GO U.S. 7:30. 
7·10 (19H:l) (plurality opinion) (noting ''thPre is no legitimate exjwdation of privacy . 
shielding that portion of the int.Prior of an aut.omobill' which may be vil'wed from 
outside the vehicle by either inquisitivle passersby or diligPnt polict• oftln•rs"). 
28. Class, 175 U.S. at 111. 
29. See e.g., Hakas v. Illinois, 1:19 U.S. 128. 11:1 (197/l); Unill'd States v. Baker. 
221 F.:ld 1:38, 111-12 (:ld Cir. 2000) C[AJ passl'ngt•r in n car that lw rwithl'r owns nor 
leases typically has no standing to challengte a search of the car."); United States v. 
BuchnPr. 7 F.:ld 1119. 11 i'i1 (:)th Cir. 199:3) ("'Tlw owner of a suitcaSl' locatl•d in 
another's car may have a ll'gitimate expt,ctation of privacy with n•spl'ct to tlw contt,nts 
of his suitcase."). 
:10. Unitt·d Stalles v. nunyan, 275 F.:ld 119, 1fi1 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations 
omittell); accord. United States v. J{oss. ·15() U.S. 798, H22-2:l (1 9H2) (''[T]he Fourth 
Amendment providtes protection to the owm'r of l'Very contairwr that concPals its 
contents from plain view."); United Stall'S v. ,Jacobspn, •H)() U.S. 109. 1 H (19H 1) 
("Ll•tters and other sealed packagl'S are in the gem•ral class of Pfft'cl.s in which tlw 
public at large has a legitimatl~ exptectation of privacy .... "); Unitt•d States v. Fultz. 
J-1() F.:ld 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1 998) ("A person has an expcct.ation of privacy in his or 
her privatte, dosed containers."). 
:n. Unitt,d States v. Knoll. J(i F.:ld J:ll:l, J:l21 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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plain view."32 
Lastly, "[i]t is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed."'33 Consequently, an individual will 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home. As 
the Supreme Court has noted: 
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are 
places in which the individual normally expects privacy free 
of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and 
that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to 
recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this 
basic Fourth Amendment principle. 34 
This protection for "private" residences has been extended 
to other types of dwellings, including both hotel and motel 
rooms,35 as well as rooms in boarding houses. 36 
II. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN DORMITORY ROOMS 
The Supreme Court has established that college students do 
not '"shed their constitutional rights' at the schoolhouse 
:12. United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 11:30, 1437 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations 
omitted); Robbins v. California, 15:l U.S. 120, 427 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 112 
U.S. 75:3, 7f:i,1 n.1:l (1979), overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565 (1991 ). 
:1a. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 166 U.S 740, 718 (1981) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see also Kyllo v. United States, 5ilil U.S. 27, :31 
(2001) ("With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is 
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
60:3, 601 (1999) ("The [Fourth] Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect 
for the privacy of the home .... "), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
22:l (2009); Payton v. New York, 415 U.S. 57:1, 597 n.45 (1980) ("The maxim that 'every 
man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses 
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures .... ") (quotation omitted); Mincey v. 
Arizona, 4:l7 U.S. :185, :39:3 (1978) ("[Tjhe Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those 
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not 
he totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal 
law.''); Silverman v. United States, :365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core" of the 
Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
he free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."). 
34. United States v. Karo, 168 U.S. 705, 711 (1981). 
:l5. Stoner v. California, :376 U.S. 48:1, 490 (1961) (hotel room); see also United 
States v. Gordon, 168 F.:3d 1222, 1226 (lOth Cir. 1999) ("[A]n individual may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room.''); United States v. Nerber, 222 F. :3d 
597, 600 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, a hotel room is treated 
essentially the same, if not exactly the same, as a home."). 
:16. McDonald v. United States, :3:35 U.S. 451 (1918). 
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gate."37 Rather, students "have constitutional rights which 
must be respected,"3s and they can no longer be considered 
"members of what Graham Greene's Secret Police Captain 
Segura called the 'torturable class."'39 Instead, the "Fourteenth 
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures,"40 including all 
public institutions of higher education. 
In light of these pronouncements, courts have unanimously 
determined that "a student who occupies a college [or 
university] dormitory room enjoys the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment."41 As noted by one Federal court: 
A dormitory room is a student's home away from home, and 
any student may reasonably expect that once the door is 
closed to the outside, his or her solitude and secrecy will not 
be disturbed by a governmental intrusion without at least 
permission, if not invitation. The Fourth Amendment by its 
very terms guarantees this. 42 
Further, courts have reasoned that dormitory rooms are 
similar to apartments or hotel rooms for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and should be treated as such in terms of privacy 
expectations: 
A dormitory room is analogous to an apartment or a hotel 
room. . . . The [student] rented the dormitory room for a 
certain period of time, agreeing to abide by the rules 
established by his lessor, the University. As in most rental 
situations, the lessor ... reserved the right to check the room 
for damages, wear and unauthorized appliances. Such right of 
the lessor, however, does not mean [the student] was not 
entitled to have a "reasonable expectation of freedom from 
:n. Goss V. Lopt,;-:, ,119 U.S. 565, 57,1 ( 1 H75) (quoting Tinkl'r v. ])ps Moim•s lndt·p. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9:l U.S. 50:1, 50G (1969)). 
:lK Smyth v. Lubl)(>rs, :l9H F. Supp. 777, 7H5 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
:J9. /d. (citing Gil!\H/\M GREE!'H:. 0Uil MliN IN HA VAN/\ (195S), reprinted in Till I'Ll•: 
I'UilSlJI'I': i\ GK\HAM Cll~:ENI·: OMNIBUS ;l7() (1971)). 
10. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :n!J U.S. 621, (1:l7 (191:l). 
·11. Piazzola v. Watkins. 112 F.2d 2S1. 2H9 (flth Cir. 1971): accord. Sm.vth. :WI'\ F. 
Supp. at 7HG ("Tiw [studPnfsj dormitory room is his houst• and honw f(Jr all practical 
purposes. and he has thl' samt' inten,st in the privacy of this room as any adult has in 
thl• privacy of his homl', dwl'lling, or lodging."); Bl•auchamp v. State. 712 So. 2d ·1:l1. 
·1:12 (!<'Ia. Dist. Ct. i\pp. 199H) (holding the studpnt "did have an r:xppctation of privaey 
in his dormitory suite," which thl' court noted was "comparahll' to a motPl room or a 
room in a boarding house"). 
12. Morale v. Grigel. ,122 F. Supp. 91-\tl, 997 (D.N.H. HJ76). 
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governmental intrusion" .... 43 
Finally, the fact that "members of the public may make an 
occasional dormitory visit does not contravene the ... finding 
that the living areas of a residence hall are private in 
nature."44 Generally, ownership is an "important consideration 
in determining the existence and extent of a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment interests."45 This ownership factor is thus 
applicable in the dormitory context. However, this ownership 
factor is not dispositive in finding that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists for students living in a university-
owned dormitory.46 "Applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
does not turn on the nature of the property interest in the 
searched premises, hut on the reasonableness of the person's 
privacy expectation."47 
Ill. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN COMMON AREAS 
While a student's expectation of privacy in a dormitory 
room is well-established, there is a dearth of case law 
discussing whether that expectation extends into the common 
areas of a dormitory, such as lobbies, hallways and stairwells. 
1:1. J>iazzola, 442 F.2d at 288 (quotation omitted). 
11. Brush v. l'a. State Univ., 111 A2d 48, 52 n.6 (l'a. 1980). 
15. United States v. Angevine, 281 F.:id ll:HJ, 11:34 (10th Cir. 2002) (~itation 
omitted); accord. United States v. Salvu~~i. 448 U.S. 8:3, 91 (1980) (noting that the 
Court has long recognized that property ownership is a "factor to he considered in 
determining whPther an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated ... 
. "); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 118 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) ("[P]etitioner's ownership of the' 
drugs is undoubtedly one faet to be considered" in dc~iding whether standing existed.); 
United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.:1d 1112, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ("No single factor 
determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth 
Amendment that a place should he free of warrantless government intrusion .... 
However, we• have given weight to such factors as the defendant's possessory interest 
in the property searched or seized, ... the measures taken by the defendant to insure 
privacy, ... whether the materials arc in a container lahclcd as being private, ... and 
the• presence or absence of a right to exclude others from access.") (citations omitted). 
16. Salvucci, 418 U.S. at 91 ("[P]roperty rights arc neither the beginning nor the 
end of a Court's inquiry" into Fourth Amendment interests.). 
4 7. Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (:3d Cir. 1978); see also Voyles v. State, 
1:3:1 S.W.3d :J0:3, at :106 (Tex. App. 2004) (among factors to consider in deciding whether 
employee had subjective expectation of priva~y is "whether the accused had a property 
or possessory interest in the place invaded," although the court noted this factor is not 
dispositive); Gatlin v. United States, 8il:l A.2d 995, 1005 (D.C. 200il) ("Moreover, 'a 
legitimate expectation of privacy turns on consideration of all of the surrounding 
cir~umstances, including but not limited to defendant's possessory interest."') (citation 
omitted); United States v. Taketa, 92:3 F.2d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
"privacy analysis does not turn on property rights"). 
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However, because dormitory rooms are analogous to apartment 
or hotel rooms, it is useful to explore how courts have viewed 
expectations of privacy in these settings in order to understand 
how such common areas would likely be addressed in a 
dormitory. That said, the majority of Federal courts have 
concluded that "tenants do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of their apartment building."4X 
However, one circuit "has recognized a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building, at 
least when the door is locked .... "49 Notwithstanding the 
above, however, all Fourth Amendment questions are fact-
based, and at least one court has held that a student residing 
in a dormitory will have an expectation of privacy in the 
hallway of the building. 
For example, in State u. Houuener, a student that was 
attending Washington State University claimed his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by police conducting a 
warrantless search. 50 After a campus police officer received a 
report of a theft in the dormitory, the officer initiated a search 
of the entire dormitory complex, beginning around the 13th floor 
and continuing until he eventual1y reached the student's room 
on the 6th floor. 51 After hearing what he believed were 
incriminating statements coming from inside Houvener's room, 
the officer attempted a ruse to get the occupants to open the 
door. 52 When that failed, he identified himself as a police officer 
and ordered the students to open the door. 53 Houvener opened 
1~. UnitPd Statl:s v. Mira valles. 2HO F.:ld 1 :l2~. 1 :l:ll (11th Cir·. 2002); see also 
United Stall:s v. Rheault, 561 F.:ld G5. ri9 (1st Cir. 200()) (noting that "it is hPymHl cavil 
in this circuit. that. a (.pnant lacks a reasonablt' <'XJll'ctat.ion of j)l'ivacy in thP common 
areas of an apartment building") (citations omitted); United St.at.es v. Paradis.;)::; 1 F.:ld 
21. :ll (1st. Cir. 20(J:l) (noting that a dd',mdant had no privacy int.erPst. in hag of 
ammunition left on the back porch of an apart.mPnt. building hecaus<' "lH' had no 
expectation of privacy in lfw common areas of a multi-family building"); Unit,•d St.at.<•s 
v. Nohara, :J F.:ld 12:lU, 12·11-12 (9th Cir. HJ9:l) (apartment. hallway): Unitl'd Stat.Ps v. 
Concepcion, (H2 F.2d 1170, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1 mll) (apartnwnt common an·as): Unit<·d 
States v. Barrios-Moriera, H72 F.2d 12, 11-1 ri (2d Cir. 191-19) (apartnwnt hallwa:-·). 
oucrruled on othl'r grounds by Horton v. California. 119G U.S. 12:-\ (1990); UnitPd Stat<•s 
v. Eisler, CiG7 F.2d 1-111, 8Hi (8th Cir. 1977) (apartment. hallway); Unit.l·d Stat<•s v. Cruz 
Pagan. :5:l7 F.2d 55·1, i'i5:-\ (1st. Cir. 1976) (und(•t·ground parking garage of 
condominium). 
1~1. Mirauallcs, 2:-\0 F.:ld at 1:l:l:l: Sl'l' United States v. Carriger, f')'t 1 l"-2d G15. :)riO 
(Gth Cir. 197(1) (apart.tm:nt. common areas). 
50. 1 HG P.:ld :l70, :l71-75 (Wash. Ct. i\pp. 200~). 
51. /d. at :l71. 
52. /d. 
s:J. Id. 
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the door, entered the dormitory hallway as requested, and 
made incriminating statements while the officer questioned 
him, resulting in his arrest. 54 Houvener then retrieved the 
stolen items from his room. 55 The appellate court affirmed the 
trial court's decision to suppress the evidence seized from 
Houvener's dormitory room, concluding that "it was unlawfully 
obtained by police when an officer conducted a building-wide 
search of the interior hallways of the dormitory without a 
warrant."56 
The court focused heavily on the physical layout of the 6th 
floor of the dormitory, noting that (a) the floor residents share 
a study area and bathroom;57 (b) the residents of that floor are 
"viewed as a living group independent of residents of other 
floors;"58 (c) while outsiders can access the lobby of the 
dormitory, "they may not access any of the floors without a 
pass key or without the escort of a resident of that floor;"59 and 
(d) each "living group is permitted to develop its own visitation 
schedule for its main lounge and lobbies."60 The court 
distinguished students living together in a dormitory from 
tenants in an apartment building, reasoning that "student 
residents have a right to privacy in the hallway they share. 
These students are not strangers-they share close quarters, 
intimate spaces, and a common academic and social 
experience."61 Interestingly, the court also considered the 
notion of "curtilage" in its analysis, finally holding that: 
In assessing Mr. Houvener's privacy interest in his living 
group hallway, the focus is whether, under the circumstances, 
the hallway should be placed under the home's "'umbrella' of 
Fourth Amendment protection." The curtilage has been 
considered "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes .... " Because of the intimate nature of the activities 
in the hallway-most remarkably, towel-clad residents 
navigating the hallways to and from the shared shower 
facilities-it is reasonable to hold that this area is 
51. ld. at :171-72. 
55. ld. at :112. 
56. !d. at ::371. 
57. ld. at :372. 
58. !d. at :171. 
59. !d. 
60. ld. at :l72 (quotations omitted). 
61. !d. at :175. 
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protected. ('2 
Like all Fourth Amendment questions, whether a student 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a dormitory hallway 
or common areas may only be answered after careful 
consideration of the specific underlying facts. Thus, while it can 
reasonably be said that students will not typically have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a 
dormitory, that question must ultimately be answered after 
considering the openness, security, and use of the area in 
question. So, for example, if (a) access to the area is restricted 
to residents or others escorted by residents based upon 
institution or dormitory policies and practices, (b) the area is 
used for "intimate" activities, such as proceeding to and from 
shared shower facilities, and (c) the area contains shared areas 
that are provided for the independent use of students on a 
particular floor of the dormitory, it is entirely possible that 
students could have an expectation of privacy in the hallways 
of a dormitory. Alternatively, where (a) access to the hallways 
of the dormitory is not restricted to residents or escorted 
guests, (b) shower facilities are provided in individual rooms or 
suites so that travel throughout the common areas is not 
required, and/or (c) the general use of the area is not consistent 
with an independent group living arrangement, a student 
would likely not be entitled to an expectation of privacy in the 
common areas of the dormitory. 
IV. PRIVATE SEARCHES AND RESIDENT ASSISTANTS 
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private searches. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth 
Amendment "is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even 
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting 
as an agent of the government or with the participation or 
knowledge of any government official."('3 Stated more plainly, 
the Fourth Amendment does not regulate private conduct, 
regardless of the conduct's reasonableness. Nevertheless, "[t]he 
government may not do, through a private individual, that 
62. /d. at :l7:l-7:t (quoting UnitPd States v. Dunn. ·11-lO U.S. 291. :l01 (191-l7) and 
Oliver v. UnitPd States. ·Hi(i U.S. 170, 1SO (19H1)). 
G:l. United Statc~s v . .Jacobsc•n. 1GG U.S. 109, 11:l (1Uil1) (quotations and citation 
omittod). 
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which it is otherwise forbidden to do."64 Thus, if a private party 
conducts a search as an instrument or agent of the 
government, the Fourth Amendment will apply to that party's 
actions.65 Private searches become governmental depending 
"on the degree of the government's participation in the private 
party's activities, ... a question that can only be resolved 'in 
light of all the circumstances."'66 In making such a 
determination, the lower courts have almost uniformly applied 
the following two-part test or a close variant: (a) "whether the 
government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct," 
and (b) "whether the party performing the search intended to 
assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends."67 
While, a court must find both before an agency relationship can 
be deemed to exist,68 it is important to note that the greater the 
government involvement in the search, the less important the 
private searcher's intent.69 
A. Government Knowledge and Acquiescence 
The first factor courts typically consider in determining 
whether a search is private or governmental is the extent of the 
government's knowledge of, and participation in, the private 
actor's conduct. 70 Within the context of private searches, 
knowledge and acquiescence "encompass the requirement that 
the government agent must . . . affirmatively encourage, 
61. United States v. Feffer, 8:31 F.2d 731, 7:37 (7th Cir. 1987). 
65. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 10:3 U.S. 113, 487 (1971) (quotations omitted). 
66. Skinner v. Hy. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989) (quotations 
omitted). 
67. United States v. Alexander. 447 F.:ld 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Ginglen, 167 F.:ld 1071, 1074 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Steiger, 318 
F.:3d 10:39, 1015 (11th Cir. 200:3); United States v. Young, 15:3 F.:3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 
1998); United States v .• Jenkins, 16 F.::ld 44 7, !160 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 162 (8th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Jarrett, ::l::l8, F.3d 
a::l9, :341-15 (4th Cir. 200:1) (combining the two factors into "one highly pertinent 
consideration"). ln United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.:3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997), the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt "any specific 'standard' or 'test,"' identifying 
instead several factors that may be relevant to this determination: "the extent of the 
government's role in instigating or participating in the search, its intent and the de!,>Tee 
of control it exercises over the search and the private party, and the extent to which the 
private party aims primarily to help the government or to serve its own interests." 
68. Jarrett, a:38 F.::ld at il15; see also United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 112:3 
(1Oth Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. ::l95 (2009). 
69. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 461 F.3d 180, 488 n.7 (lith Cir. 2006). 
70. Alexander, 117 F.:ld at 1295. 
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1mtiate or instigate the private action."71 Consequently, a 
private search can be converted into a governmental one only 
where there is "some exercise of governmental power over the 
private entity, such that the private entity may be said to have 
acted on behalf of the government rather than for its own, 
private purposes."72 In making this determination, courts will 
"consider whether the private actor performed the search at the 
request of the government, or whether the government 
otherwise initiated, instigated, orchestrated, encouraged, or 
participated in the search."73 "Mere knowledge of another's 
independent action, does not produce vicarious responsibility 
absent some manifestation of consent and the ability to 
control."74 
Similarly, simply taking control of evidence "gathered by a 
private party acting without the State's instigation or 
direction" does not transform a private search into a 
governmental one. 75 In order for a private search to be 
considered governmental, courts typically require that a 
government agent be either involved in the search directly as a 
participant, or indirectly as an encourager. 76 As one court has 
noted: "where [governmentJ officials actively participate in a 
search being conducted by private parties or else stand by 
watching with approval as the search continues, [the 
governmental] authorities are clearly implicated in the search 
and it must comport with Fourth Amendment requirements."77 
Implicit in this requirement, of course, is that the government 
must have knowledge of the private actor's conduct before it 
actually occurs. "Where no official of the ... government has 
any connection with a wrongful seizure, or any knowledge of it 
71. United States v. Smythe, H·1 F.:ld 1210. 12·1:l (lOth Cir. 19~Hi). 
72. Unitt'd States v. Shahid, 117 F.:ld :l22, :l25 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotation 
omitted); see also .Jarrett. :l:lf-1 F.:ld at :l1·1 ("'Tjo run afoul of tlw l<'ourth Anwndnwnt .. 
. thL' Governnwnt must do more than passively accept or acquiesce in n private pnrty's 
search efforts. Hather, there must be some degreL' of GovL,rnmL•nt participation in tlw 
private search."). 
7:L State v. Santingo, 217 l'.:ld 1-19, 95 (N.M. 2009). 
7•1. UnitPd StatPs v. Koenig. f\56 F.2d 8·1:l. f\50 (7th Cir. 19HK). 
7fi. United Statps v. D'Andn•a, 197 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (D. Mass. 2007). uamted 
on other grounds. G·1H F.:ld 1 (1st Cir. 2011); see also ,Jarrett, :l:lH F.:ld at :H5-·16 (In 
order to flnd a private sParch has hL•come gowrnmental, thl'rl' must bt• l'vidL•ncp of 
government "participation in or affirmative encouragemL•nt of thL• privatP sl'an·h," 
becaust' "passive acceptance by the Government is not t•ncmgh."). 
76. United StatPs v. LPffall, 82 F.:ld :11:1, :l-17 (1Oth Cir. 1996). 
77. United States v. ML,kjian, fiO:) F.2d 1 :l20, 1 :l27 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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until after the fact, the evidence is admissible."78 Thus, for 
example, if a law enforcement officer actively sought out and 
requested that a private citizen conduct a search of a suspect's 
property (e.g., his or her computer), this would almost certainly 
qualify as a governmental search due to the initiation and 
instigation of the private action. 79 Alternatively, where a 
private citizen conducts a search without the government's 
knowledge and only later provides law enforcement personnel 
evidence of any crime uncovered during that search, it is likely 
this situation would not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 80 
B. Intent to Assist Law Enforcement 
The second factor courts typically consider when analyzing 
the validity of a private search is whether the private actor 
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or was, instead, 
attempting to further his own ends. Of course, there are many 
reasons why a private citizen might, of their own volition, seek 
out criminal activity: 
A private citizen might decide to aid in the control and 
prevention of criminal activity out of his or her own moral 
conviction, concern for his or her employer's public image or 
profitability, or even desire to incarcerate criminals, but even 
if such private purpose should happen to coincide with the 
purposes of the government, "this happy coincidence does not 
make a private actor an arm of the government." 81 
At least one court has noted that a private individual 
conducting a search "[a]lmost always ... will be pursuing his 
own ends-even if only to satisfy curiosity-although he may 
have a strong intent to aid law enforcement."82 However, as 
discussed above, a "private party cannot be deemed a 
government agent unless it was induced to act by some 
78. Jd. 
79. See United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that, in addition to the two commonly used factors, other useful criteria would include 
whethc'r the private actor performed the search at the request of the government); 
United v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 79:l (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "the government 
cannot knowingly acquiesce in and encourage directly or indirectly a private citizen to 
engage in activity which it is prohibited from pursuing where that citizen has no 
motivation other than the expectation of reward for his or her e!Iorts"). 
80. United States v. Steiger, :n~:; F.:3d JO::l9, 1015 (11th Cir. 200:3). 
81. Unitl'd States v. Shahid, 117 F. :3d :322, :326 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 
82. United States v. Leffall, 82 F.:ld :l1:l, :l47 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
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government action."~0 "'fW]here the private party has ... a 
legitimate independent motivation for' engaging in the 
challenged conduct, the lFJourth fA]mendment would not 
apply."x4 Even "[w]here the private citizen is motivated both to 
assist the government and to further his or her own objectives, 
the private citizen is not acting as an agent of the 
government."X5 Two other factors relevant in determining the 
private actors' motivation for conducting the search are 
whether the government offered a reward,x6 and whether the 
private actor was a confidential informant. X7 Finally, a long-
line of cases holds that "an off-duty police officer acts as a 
government agent, where he or she stumbles upon criminal 
activity and attempts to collect evidence for law 
enforcement."xx 
C. Resident Assistants 
Courts have reached inconsistent conclusions regarding 
whether to treat resident assistants as state or private actors 
for purposes of dormitory searches. While one federal court has 
found a search conducted by a resident assistant to he state 
action,x9 at least two state courts have notY0 
In Morale u. Grigel,91 the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire concluded that a Hesident 
Assistant was a governmental agent and thus his search was 
s:l. 8/zahid, 117 F.:ld at :l25-26. 
S!J. United State's v. Attson, ~()() F.2d l!J27. l!J:l2 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omittl'd: 
emphasis in original); see also UnitPd Statl's v. Koenig, SG() F.2d S!l:l. 850 (7th Cir. 
191\S) (noting that "once tlw court is satisfied that a privat<• <•ntity has cotHiuctc·d a 
search for its own, private n~asons and not as an instrumPnl or agent of thP 
government, the spl'cific t·eason for the search no longl'r matt.t•rs") (quotation omittPd). 
SF>. United States v .• Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d ;)](), :l2(i (M.D. l'a. 2008). 
1\6. Unitt•d States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d •158. •162 (8th Cir. 1990). 
87. Compare UnitPd States v. McAllistn. 18 F.:ld 1·112. H17-19 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(in finding a eonficl<•ntia1 informant (Cl) to be a privatl' actm. tlw court notpd that 
"neither the case law nor common sPnse supports thl' proposition that a C.l. 
automatically obtains and retains an ongoing status as a law t·nforc<•ment officer or a 
governmental agent .... ") ll'ith UnitPd States v. Barth, 2\5 F. Supp. 2d 929, 9:l5-:Hi 
(W.D. Tex. 1991') (holding a confldential informant's actions <JttributablP to 
govc•rnmPnt). 
SK. UnitPd Statps v. Gingkn. ,167 F.:ld 1071. 107P>-7ti (7th Cir. 200(5) (coll"cting 
cases). 
S9. Morale v. GrigPl, 122 F. Supp. 91'8, 996 (D.N.ll. 197G). 
90. s('(' StatP v. KappPS, 550 1'.2d 121' 12:l-21 (Ariz. Ct. i\pp. 19/(i); Stall' v. Ellis. 
2006 Ohio 15118, ~1,115-16 (Ohio Ct. i\pp. 2006). 
91. 122 F. Supp. 981-1 (D.N.H. 197<1). 
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restricted by the Fourth Amendment. The court addressed the 
legality of a series of dormitory searches that occurred at the 
New Hampshire Technical Institute (NHTI). 92 Following the 
theft of a stereo in the dormitory, a room-by-room search of the 
dormitory was conducted by Lane, the Head Resident, and 
Grigel, a second-year student employed as a Resident 
Assistant. 93 According to the court, it was clear that "this 
initial inspection . . . was performed under the authority 
granted Lane and Grigel by NHTI in their respective capacities 
as Head Resident and Resident Assistant."94 Because Grigel 
had seen a dislocated ceiling tile in Morale's room, he 
determined to search the room for a second time that same 
evening looking for the stolen stereo. 95 Morale was not present 
on this second occasion and his door was locked. 96 Mter 
attempting to pick the lock to Morale's door, Grigel obtained 
Lane's passkey under false pretenses and again searched the 
room.97 On this occasion, Lane was not present and Grigel's 
search was conducted "without any actual authority."9s Grigel 
conducted a third search one day later; according to the court, 
he was "on duty as a proctor at the time and assumed a general 
authority to search for stolen property."99 Accompanied by 
other students, Grigel's third search of Morale's room turned 
up a film canister with marijuana seeds in it. 100 Upon notifying 
Lane of this discovery, a fourth search of Morale's room ensued, 
with Grigel locating a pipe in a desk. 101 When confronted by 
these discoveries, Morale acknowledged the items were his. 102 
Ultimately, Morale filed a civil suit under Title 42, United 
States Code Section 1983 against Lane, Grigel, and numerous 
others for violations of his constitutional rights. 103 The defense 
claimed that at least some of these searches were private 
92. /d. at 991. 
9:3. ld. at 991-92. 









lO:l. /d. at 991. 
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searches. 104 The court rejected the notion that either Lane or 
Grigel were acting in a privacy capacity while carrying out 
these searches, reminding the institution that students do no 
forego their Fourth Amendment rights while attending 
college. 105 The court held: . 
It is apparent that the marijuana was seized as a result of 
official action. NHTI is a state institution ... and Lane is 
employed by it .... Grigel also was employed by NHTl. 
Although not paid in the usual manner, Grigel received 
compensation in the form of a credit toward his room and 
board costs for his services as Resident Assistant .... He was 
not issued a pass key, but was given the responsibility of 
supervising the students in the dormitory and rendering any 
kind of assistance they needed. . . . I conclude that the 
searches as conducted by Lane and Grigcl were governmental 
in nature. 106 
Alternatively, in State v. Kappes, 107 the court concluded 
that a Resident Assistant's search was not a result of 
governmental action. A Northern Arizona University student 
lived in a university-owned and operated dormitory. 10x In her 
housing agreement she agreed to abide by all university 
regulations, including one that permitted the institution to 
enter a dormitory room and inspect for cleanliness, safety, or 
maintenance issues. 109 These routine inspections were carried 
out monthly, and notice of each inspection was provided 
twenty-four hours ahead of time. 110 During one of these 
inspections by two student resident advisors, who entered the 
room through the use of a master key, a pipe and marijuana 
butts were observed in plain view on a desk. 111 Two campus 
security officers were notified and the student was ultimately 
arrested, charged, and convicted of misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana. 112 On appeal, Kappes claimed the evidence used 
against her had been seized in violation of the Fourth 
101. /d. at ~)!JG-97. 
105. /d. 
1 Ofi. /d. at 996. 
107. 550 1'.2d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). 
10il. /d. at 122. 
109. /d. 
110. /d. 
111. /d. at 122-2:3. 
112. /d. at 12:3. 
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Amendment. 1 13 
In rejecting her claim, the court initially noted that "if a law 
enforcement official initiated the investigation and then gained 
entry to a student's room without a warrant, evidence seized 
thereby would be barred under the fourth amendment."' 14 The 
court reasoned that the "same result has followed where the 
entry is made by a school official who does so at the request of, 
or in cooperation with, law enforcement officials." 115 However, 
the court held that because, "the entry [was] made by a student 
advisor conducting a routine dormitory inspection announced 
in advance, [the court could not] say that the intrusion [was] 
the result of government action .... "1 16 Instead, the court 
concluded that the "purpose of the room inspection [was] not to 
collect evidence for criminal proceedings against the student, 
but to insure that the rooms [were] used and maintained m 
accordance with the university regulations." 117 Accordingly: 
While the actions of the student resident advisors in carrying 
out room inspections serve the internal requirements of the 
university, we do not find that they are tainted with that 
degree of governmental authority which will invoke the fourth 
amendment. . . . It follows then that the student advisors 
acting in this capacity do so as private persons rather than 
government agents for the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
Their conduct is not circumscribed by the fourth amendment 
since its sanctions do not apply to private persons. 11 g 
While the results of these cases may appear inconsistent, at 
least one significant distinction can be drawn between the two 
cases: the Resident Assistant in Morale had exceeded the scope 
of his authority by searching for evidence of criminal activity, 
while the Resident Assistant in Kappes had not. 
Notwithstanding the result in Kappes, it makes greater 
sense, practically, to consider a resident assistant a state actor 
for purposes of the Fourth amendment. First, while courts have 
typically drawn distinctions between routine health and safety 
inspections and those initiated to ferret out criminal activity, 
"searches motivated by something other than the prospect of 
ll~l. /d. at 122. 
111. !d. at 12:3. 
115. /d. 
116. /d. at 12-1. 
117. /d. at 12-1. 
118. /d. at 124 (citations omitted). 
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obtaining evidence of crime [are still] subject to the general 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness .... " 119 Second, 
courts have attempted to separate resident assistants from the 
institutions that employ and empower them. While 
theoretically possible, the reality is that resident assistants are 
so inextricably linked to the institution that it is impossible to 
separate them. Resident assistants are, for all practical 
purposes, public employees of the institution. Like other faculty 
and staff, they receive appropriate compensation from the 
institution, either directly through monetary payments or 
indirectly through the provision of room and board, which may 
include even a meal plan. Further, resident assistants are 
empowered by the delegation of authority from the public 
institution. Without that institutional authorization, resident 
assistants have none of the rights they exercise in terms of 
conducting dormitory searches. In light of these considerations, 
it seems more reasonable to conclude that resident assistants 
are public actors for Fourth Amendment purposes, rather than 
to conclude they are not. 
V. CONSENT SEARCHES 
A search that is conducted pursuant to consent is a well 
"established exception[] to the requirements of both a warrant 
and probable cause." 120 Thus, "[i]n situations where the police 
have some evidence of illicit activity, hut lack probable cause to 
arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be 
the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence." 121 In order to withstand judicial scrutiny, a consent 
search has two basic requirements: first, the consent must have 
been given voluntarily; and second, the consent must have been 
given by someone with either actual or apparent authority over 
the area or item to be searched. 122 
119. l'ichav. Wielgos, 110 F. Supp. 1~11, ~~~O(N.D.Ill. 197()); accordCamamv. 
Mun. Court, :l87 U.S. 5~:l, 5:H (19G7). 
120. Schneckloth v. Bustamonk !JI2 U.S. 21!-\, 219 (Hl7:l). 
121. /d.at~~7. 
1 ~~- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 197 U.S. 177, 1 ill (1990) ("The Fourth Anwndnwnt 
gerwrally prohibits tht' warrant]pss ''ntry of a pt,mon's honw, wlwtlwr to makt• an 
arrest or to search for specific objt•cts .... The prohibition dm•s not apply. howt>v<•r. to 
situations in which voluntary consent has lllet'n obtained. <:itlwr from tlw individual 
whose property is searched .... or from a third party who posspsst•s common authoritv 
over the prl'misps .... ") (intl'rnal citations omitted). 
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A. Voluntariness 
Both "the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments reqmre 
that 0 0 0 consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, 
by implied threat or covert forceo" 123 In making this 
determination, courts will look at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of the consent, because 
"it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual 
consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was 
voluntary or coercedo" 124 Courts have considered a variety of 
factors in determining whether consent to search was 
voluntarily given, including (a) the age, education, and 
intelligence of the individual; 125 (b) the individual's knowledge 
of his or her right to refuse consent; 126 (c) the length of any 
detention that occurred prior to the giving of the consent; 127 (d) 
the repeated and prolonged nature of any questioning that led 
to the consent; 128 (e) whether the consent was given in 
writing; 129 (f) the use of physical punishment, such as sleep or 
food deprivation; 130 (g) whether the individual cooperated in 
the search; 131 (h) whether the suspect was in custody at the 
time the consent was given; 132 (i) the suspect's belief that no 
1280 Schnechloth, 112 U.S. at 228. 
124. Jd. at 238. 
125. Jd. at 226; United States v. Asibor, 109 F.:~d 102:~. 1088 n.H (5th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Smith, 260 F.:ld 922, 921 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Givan, :320 
F.::ld 152, 159 (:'lei Cir. 2008); United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d ::397, 102 (6th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Lattimon,, 87 F.:id 617, 650 (1th Cir. 1996); United States v. Taylor, 
196 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 1999); United States Vo Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
126. Schnechloth, 112 U.S. at 227; United States v. Watson, 42c1 U.S. 411, 124 
(1976); Asibor, 109 F.:ld at 10:l8 n.14; United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Ivy, 165 F.:id at 102; JJlahe, 888 F.2d at 798. 
127. Schneckloth, 112 U.S. at 226; Smith, 260 F.:3d at 921; Hubbard v. Haley, 817 
F.::ld 1215, 125:3 (11th Cir. 200:3); luy, 165 F.:ld at 402; Lattimore, 87 F.8d at 650; 
Taylor, 196 F.:3d at 860. 
128. Schnechloth, 112 U.S. at 226. 
129. United States v. Boone, 215 F.::ld :i52, :i62 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Written consent 
supports a finding that the consent was voluntary."); United States v. Navarro, 90 F.8d 
1215, 1257 (7th Cir. 1996). 
1:10. Schnechloth, 112 U.S. at 226; Smith, 260 F.:3d at 924; Hubbard, :317 F.:ld at 
125:5; luy, 165 F.:ld at 402. 
1:31. United States v. Carrate, 122 F.:ld 666, 670 (8th Cir. 1997) (suspect "idly 
stood by while thP troopers searched his car, never indicating that he objected to the 
search"); United States v. McSween, 5:~ F.8d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Givan, :320 F.:3d 152, 159 (:Jd Cir. 2008); Blahe, 888 Fo2d at 798. 
1::l2. United States v. Watson, 12:5 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (noting that while custody 
is a factor to be considered, the Court emphasized that "the fact of custody alone has 
never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search"); 
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incriminating evidence will be found; 133 (j) the presence of 
coercive police procedures, such as displaying weapons or using 
force; 134 (k) the individual's experience in dealing with law 
enforcement officers; 135 (l) whether the suspect was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; 136 (m) whether the suspect was 
notified of his or her Miranda Warnings; 137 (n) whether the 
police made promises or misrepresentations; 13 ~ (o) the location 
where the consent was given; 139 (p) whether the defendant had 
been told that a search warrant could be obtained if consent 
was not given; 140 and (q) whether there were repeated requests 
for consent. 141 The burden of proving that consent was given 
voluntarily rests with the government, "is a question of fact to 
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances," 142 
and "cannot be discharged by showing no more than 
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." 143 
Smith, 2GO F.:ld at 921; United Statps v. i\sihor. 109 F.:ld 102:1. JO:JK n. H (Gth Cir. 
1997); Unitl'll States v. Jones, 2SG F.:Jd 1 HG, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002); Taylor, HHi F.:Jd at 
SGO; Blahc SSR F.2d at 79R; United States v. Cellitti, :JH7 F.:Jd G1S. G22-2:l (7th Cir. 
20(],1) ("Consl'nt given during an illegal dl'l.ention is presumptively invalid," but "may 
neverthdess be valid provided that it is sufficiently attenuatl'd from tlw ii!Pgal police 
action to dissipatl' the taint."). 
1 :J:l. Asihor, 109 F.:ld at 10:31-l n. 11; !3lahe, HSH F.2d at 791-l. 
1 :1'1. Orhorhaghe v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., :3S F.:ld 11-lll. GOO (()th 
Cir. 1\:J~H); Aoibor, 109 F.:ld at 10:lll n. H; Taylor 19() F.:ld at HGO; nluke. HilS F.2d at 
79/l. 
l:lG. Watson. 12:3 U.S. at ·12·1-25; Smith, 260 F.:ld at 921; United Stall" v. 
Lattimore, S7 F.:ld (i·17. 651 (1th Cir. 199G); Unit,,d States v. Barrwt.t. 91-l~l F.2d CiHi, 
55G (1st Cir. Hl9:l). 
1:Hi. Smith. 260 F.:ld at 92·1. 
1:l7. Watson, 12:l U.S. at 12G; Smith, 2(i0 F.:ld nt 92•1; .Jones. 2k(i F.:lrl nt 11G2; 
Taylor, HHi F.:ld at HfiO. 
1 :JH. Watson. 12:3 U.S. at 121; Smith, 260 F.:ld at 92•1; Hubbard v. I! ale~·. :n7 F.:ld 
1215, 126:l (11th Cir. 200:l); Hadley v. Williams. :lGH F.:ld 7•17, 719 (7t.h Ci1·. 2001). 
1:19. Watson, '12:l U.S. at 121 (finding that a suspect's consent was valid in pnrt 
hPc<mse it "was givl'n while on a public street, not in thl' confines of tlw policl' stat ion''); 
Smith 2(i() F.:ld at. 92·1; United Statl'S v. Givan. :l20 F.:ld '1Ci2, 1:)9 (:ld Cir. 200:3); 
I~attimore, K7 F.:ld at ()GO. 
HO . • Jones, 2/lfi F.:ld at 1152; United Statl'S v. Soriano, :J1(i F.:ld 96:l, 971 (9th Cir. 
200:3) (In such situations, applicat.ion of this factor "hingps on whdher a suspect is 
infornwd about the possibility of a search warrant. in a threatPning nwnnl'r."). 
111. Taylor, 19G F.:-ld at f-160; but see United States v. ,Jmws. 2Ci1 F.:ld (i92. (i9fi (Kth 
Cir. 2001) (noting that "[tjherP is certainly no kgal rule that asking more than oncp f(Jr 
permission to search renders a suspect's consent involuntary, . particular!:-· whl'rl' 
thl' suspect's initial response is ambiguous") (intl•rnal citation omittPd). 
112. Schneckloth v. llustamonte.112 U.S. 211-l, 227 (197:3). 
11:l. Bumper v. North Carolina. :l91 U.S. G1:l, 5'11-l-,19 (19GK); Orhorhnghl· v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Sprv., :ls F.:ld 1/lR, fiOO (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]hl'rl' can 
he no effective consent to a sl'an:h or seizun• if that consent follows a law Pnfort'l'ml'nt 
officpr's assprtion of an independent right to pngagP in such conduct."); UnitPd StatPs v. 
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Within the context of a dormitory, courts will consider the 
above factors in determining whether a student voluntarily 
gave his or her consent to a search of a dormitory room. 
Generally, no single identified factor will be dispositive; 
instead, courts will consider the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent to determine whether it was given 
voluntarily. 
B. Actual or Apparent Authority 
In addition to being given voluntarily, valid consent to 
search must be given by an individual with actual or apparent 
authority over the area to be searched. "Actual" authority to 
consent to a search of property is possessed by the owner of the 
property. 144 However, a third-party possessing common 
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises 
or effects sought to be inspected" can also have "actual" 
authority to provide valid consent to search. 145 As stated by 
the Supreme Court: 
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the 
mere property interest a third party has in the property. The 
authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest 
upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and 
legal refinements ... but rests rather on mutual use of the 
property by persons generally having joint access or control 
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that 
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the 
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed 
the risk that one of their number might permit the common 
area to be searched. 146 
Alternatively, consent to search an area may be given by 
one who has apparent authority over the area to be searched. 
"Apparent authority turns on whether the facts available to the 
officer at the time would allow a person of reasonable caution 
to believe that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises." 147 Stated differently, "apparent authority" exists 
Cedano-Medina, ;j66 F.:ld 682, 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (The burden of proving consent is on 
government, and sueh burden "is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim 
of lawful authority.") (citation omitted). 
141. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (eitation omitted). 
145. United States v. Matlock, 115 U.S. 164,171 (1974). 
116. /d.at171n.7. 
117. United States v. King, 627 F.:ld 611,648 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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when consent is given by one whom the officers, at the time of 
the search, reasonably, albeit erroneously, believed possessed 
common authority over the area to be searched. 14~ 
The scope of any authorized consent search "is generally 
defined by its expressed object," 149 and courts use an objective 
reasonableness standard for measuring this aspect of the 
search. 15° Further, an individual may limit the scope of any 
consent given, 151 as well as revoke consent at any time. 152 
Finally, consent may be given expressly by an individual or 
may be inferred from his or her words and/or actions. 153 
C. Roommates 
As a general rule, "[w]hen an apartment. is shared, one 
ordinarily assumes the risk that a co-tenant might consent to a 
search, at least to all common areas and those areas to which 
118. See, e.g .. Rodriguez, 197 U.S. at 1:-l:)-86 ("It is apparent that in ordt•r· to satisf~· 
the 'reasonablt:m:ss' requirement of tht• Fourth Amendment. what is generally 
demandt>d of ... agt:nts of the govprnmt•nt ... is not that tht>y always be cm-rt•ct, but 
that they always be reasonable."): United States v. Amra tiel, (i2:l F.:ld 91-1, 91 f) (Sth 
Cir. 20 10) ("A warrantlt•ss search is justified when an offict•r n:asuna hi:-· n:l it•s on a 
third party's demonstration of' apparent authority, pven if that party lacks common 
authority."), cert. denied, 1 :n S. Ct. 15•J!I (2011); United States v. Morgan. •l:l5 F.:ld 
660. 66:l (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hunyady, ·109 F.:ld 297, :m:l ((ith Cir·. 
2005)) ("Apparent authority is judged by an objectivt: standard. A st:arch consented to 
by a third party without actual authority over the premises is nonethelt•ss valid if tlw 
offict>rs n:asonably could condude from the facts availablt• that the third party had 
aut.horit~· to consent to the search."). 
J.19. Florida v .. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 2•1:-\, 2G1 (HJ91). 
150. /d. ("The standard for nwasuring the scopP of a suspt•ct.'s const•nt undt•r tfw 
Fourth Amendnwnt is that of 'ohjt•ctivt: reasonablt>ness-what would tlw typical 
n•asonable person have understood by tlw l'Xchange bl'twt•t•n tlw of'f'it'l'l' and the 
suspect'!") (citations omitted). 
151. /d. at 252 ("A suspect may of course dt:limit as ht: choost:s t.ht' ol'OJll' of tlw 
ot:arch to which he const:nts."): Waltt:r v. Unitt•d Statt:s, '117 U.S. ()19, fi5(i (1980) 
(plurality opinion) ("Wlwn an official Sl'arch is properly authorizl'd-wlwtlwr by 
consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant-tht' scope of tlw search is limitl'd h:v· tlw 
terms of its authorization."). 
1 G2. See, e.g., l'aintpr v. Hobertson, 1 HG F.:ld GG7, iifi7 ((ith Cir. 1999) (noting that 
"the consenting party may limit the scope of that st'arch, and lwnct• at an:v· monwnt 
may rc•tract his consent''). 
15:l. Unitt:d States v. Hylton, :3-19 F. :3d 781, 786 (1th Cir. 200:l), abrogated in part 
by nt:orgia v. Handolph, 517 U.S. JO:l (200fi); Unitt:d States v .. Jom's, 2:'v1 F.:ld G92. (i9:) 
(8th Cir. 2001) ("Const:nt can Ill: inft:rn:d from words, gt:stures, and oUll'r conduct."): 
United Statt:s v. Cartt:r, :l78 F.:ld 581, 587 (6th Cir. 20(H); Unitt'd Statt•s v. Wt•sl'la, 22:l 
F.:ld 6GG, 66 I (7th Cir. 2000) ("The fact that then' was no direct vt'rbal t'xchangt• 
between [tht' partit:sJ in which [tht• alll,gl'd const'nting party] explicitly said 'it's o.k. 
with me for you to search the apartm<:nt,' is immaterial, as the t'vents indicatt: her 
implicit consent.''): Unitt:d States v. Buet.tm•r-.Janusch, 6·16 F.2d 759. 7() 1 (2d Cir. 1981) 
("[Cjonsent may hl' inft:rrt:d fl'Om an individual's words, gestures, or conduct."). 
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the other has access." 154 Thus, "[uJnless the complaining co-
tenant has somehow limited the other's access to a piece of 
property, the consenting co-tenant's authority extends to all 
items on the premises." 155 This is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's holding that "the consent of one who possesses common 
authority over premises or effects is valid as against the 
absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is 
shared." 156 
However, third-party consent is not without boundaries, 
especially when the situation involves co-tenants who differ on 
the issue of consent. Specifically, in instances where two 
roommates are present and have joint control over an area, the 
consent of one will not overrule the objection of the other. 157 In 
such instances, the Supreme Court has seen the need to draw 
"a fine line," that is wholly contingent upon whether the 
potential objector is present or not: "if a potential defendant 
with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, 
the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable 
search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited 
to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out." 15x Thus, "a 
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the 
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident 
cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of 
consent given ... by another resident." 159 
Applying this logic to the issue of dormitory rooms, 
including dormitory suites, it becomes clear that a student may 
voluntarily consent to a search of the room that he or she 
physically occupies within the structure, along with all 
common areas (e.g., the sitting area in a dormitory suite with 
multiple student bedrooms) and other areas within the room or 
suite to which he or she has access (e.g., a bathroom area). The 
student may also give consent to search any effects within the 
151. United States v. Ladell, 127 F.ad 622, 621 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United 
States v. ,Janis, :lX7 F.:ld 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n adult co-occupant of a 
residence may consent to a search.") (citation omitted). 
155. United States v. Richard, 991 F.2d 211, 250 (5th Cir. 199:i). 
156. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (197 4). 
157. Randolph, 517 U.S. at 111 ("Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a 
third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a 
present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police 
officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the 
ab;;ence of any consent at all."). 
158. !d. at 121. 
159. /d. at 120. 
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room over which he or she possesses common authority. 
However, a student's consent may not be honored if a 
roommate is physically present at the room and objects when 
the search request is made. 
D. Landlords (and the Institution) 
A landlord does not "have authority to waive the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement by consenting to a search 
of premises inhabited by a tenant who is not at home at the 
time of a police call." 160 Similarly, in Stoner u. California, the 
Supreme Court rejected the government's assertion that a hotel 
night clerk could consent to a search of a tenant's room, 
concluding: 
No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in 
a hoarding house, ... a guest in a hotel room is entitled to 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures .... That protection would disappear if it were left to 
depend upon the unfettered discretion of an employee of the 
hotel. 161 
While a landlord or night clerk cannot ordinarily consent to 
a search of a tenant's residence, he or she can consent to a 
search of any unoccupied spaces within the facility, 162 as well 
160. United States v. Warner, K!J:l F.2d 101, !JO:l (9th Cir. HJHK); see Chapman v. 
Unitcd Statcs, :l6G U.S. (i10, (i1(i-17 (1961) (holding that to uphold consent by a 
landlord would "n,ducc thl' Fourth i\mcndmpnt to a nullity and ]pave tenants' homes 
secure only in the discrdion of landlords.'') (inil,rnal citation and punctuation omitted): 
United Statcs v. Elliott. 50 F.:ld 180. 18(i (2d Cir. 1995) ("In gcrwral. a landlord does 
not havP common authority over an apartnwnt or otlwr dwPIIing unit IPaspd to a 
tenant.''); Unitt'd States v. Brown. 9fi1 F.2d 10:19, 101! 1 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "a 
landlady is not ordinarily Vl,Stl'd with authority to authorizl' a search of pn•misl's 
lcasPd lo a tenant''): Commonwc•alth v. McCioskc•y. 272 i\.2d 271, 27:l n.:l (l'a. Supl'r. 
Ct. 1970) ("Many othl'r case's have• hdd that om• in the position of a ll•ssor cannot 
consent to a policP Sl'an:h of a tl,nant's pn,mises, PVl'n though thP lPssor. himsl•lf has a 
right to entcr the: room or apartmcnt."). i-ie<' also Stoncr v. California. :l7(i U.S. •1K:l. 1K9 
(I ~Hi1) ("'tis important to lwar in mind that it was thl' Jll'titiorwr's constitutional right 
which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor tlw hote•l's. It was a right. 
tlwrdon:. which only the petitioner could waive by word or lked. eithl•t· dit'l•clly or 
through an agent."); UnitPd States v. ,Jeffl•rs. :H2 U.S. 'Il-l (Hl:) 1); Cunningham v. 
HPinzt•, :l52 F.2d I (9th Cir. 196G). 
Hil. Stoner, :nfi U.S. at 190 (internal citations omitted). 
1 G2. See Ellioll. GO F.:ld at 18(-) ("i\ landlord does. howe,ve,r, have authorit:> to 
consent to a sean:h by police of dwelling units in his building that are not ll·ased."): 
UnitPd States v. Law, G28 F.:ld K8K. 901 (D.C. Cir. 2001-l) ("WhilP a landlord cannot 
ordinarily consent to a span:h of a tenant's honw, ... shl' can consent to a sl'arch of an 
unleased apartmt•nt.") (internal citation omitted); Unitt•d Statps v. Williams. 5:n F.2d 
(H. ()() (1-lth Cir. 197G). 
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as any common areas of the building over which he or she had 
joint access or control. 163 This becomes relevant because it is 
generally held that, in the case of a dormitory, "the educational 
institution's position is more akin to that of any other 
landlord." 164 
This being the case, courts are understandably reluctant to 
put the student who has the college as a landlord in a 
significantly different position than a "student who lives off 
campus in a boarding house." The latter student is quite 
obviously protected by the Supreme Court's ruling ... that a 
landlord may not consent to a police search of his tenant's 
quarters merely because he has some right of entry of his own 
in connection with his position as landlord .... [T]he same may 
be said of the college landlord. 165 
Accordingly, while the institution cannot generally consent 
to a search of a student's dormitory room, consent could be 
given to search any unoccupied rooms and any common areas 
over which the institution has access and control (e.g., the 
lobby). 
E. Housing Agreements and Implied Consent 
An institution of higher education has certain powers that 
may be exercised in carrying out the institution's educational 
mission. Thus, "a college has the inherent power to promulgate 
rules and regulations; ... to discipline; ... to protect itself and 
its property; that it may expect that its students adhere to 
generally accepted standards of conduct." 166 However, "this 
comprehensive authority must be exercised consistently 'with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards.'" 167 
]();), Sec F;lliott, 50 F.:id at 18() ("l!Jf the landlord has joint access or control over 
certain areas of his apartment huilding for most purposes, he may validly consent to a 
search of those areas."); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 161, 171 n. 7 (1971) (Even assuming that 
tenant had reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallways of an apartment 
huilding, a landlord could validly consent to search of common areas "over which he 
had 'joint access or control for most purposes."'); United States v. Kellerman, 4:11 F.2d 
319. :321 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a landlord of an apartment huilding could consent 
to a search of a common hasement area). 
164. People v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d H:i1, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
165. !d. (quotation omitted). 
166. Estehan v. Cent. Mo. State Coil., 415 F2d. 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969). 
167. Smyth v. Luhhers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 7H5 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (quoting Tinker v. 
Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:3 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
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It is common for a student living in a dormitory at a public 
institution to be required to sign a standard "housing 
agreement" form. These agreements may contain a provision 
permitting the institution to conduct random inspections of 
dormitory rooms for purposes of ensuring the health and safety 
of the residential population.I(JX As one court has noted: 
Students attending a university require and are enbtled to an 
atmosphere that is conducive to educational pursuits. T n a 
dormitory situation, it is the university that accepts the 
responsibility of providing this atmosphere. Thus, it is 
incumbent upon the university to take whatever reasonable 
measures are necessary to provide a clean, safe, well-
disciplined environment in its dormitories. 1 (,') 
For these reasons, "[a]dministrative checks of dormitory 
rooms for health hazards arc permissible pursuant to the 
school's interest in the maintenance of its plant and health of 
its students, as arc searches in emergencies, such as in the case 
of fire." 170 However, while courts have acknowledged that an 
institution "retains broad supervisory powers which permit it 
to adopt" housing regulations, these regulations may not be 
overly broad. 171 Instead, inspection provisions in housing 
regulations are permissible only if the "regulation is reasonably 
construed and is limited in its application to further the 
[institution's] function as an educational institution." 172 
The regulation cannot be construed or applied so as to give 
consent to a search for evidence for the primary purpose of a 
criminal prosecution. Otherwise, the regulation itself would 
constitute an unconstitutional attempt to require a student to 
waive his protection from unreasonable searches and seizures 
as a condition to his occupancy of a college dormitory room. 173 
1G8. See e.g., Health and Safety Inspections. SYIL\<'USE UNIVI·:HSI'I'Y 01'1'1('1·: OF 
lll·:s llli·:N< 'I•: Ll FE, h Up:/ /orl.syr.edu/current-students/sou t h -cam pus/apartnwn ts/lwa I Lh-
safety-ins]wctions.html (last visited ,Jan. 2·1, 2012). 
1 G9. State v. Hunter, 8:31 P.2d lO:l:l. 10:36 (Utah Ct. i\pp. 1992). 
170. Dewrs v. S. Univ., 712 So. 2d 199. 205 (La. Ct. i\pp. HJ9K); State• v. Kappes. 
550 P.2d 121, 121 (Ariz. Ct. i\pp. 1976) ("ThP university has an obligation to provide a 
saft• and studious Pnvironment for those in nttemdancl~. It. must be solicitous of the• 
health. welfare and safdy of its students, many of whom an· l'X]ll'ril•ncing life away 
h·om home for the first time. It is Pntin•ly appropriate that it routinely inspect its 
dormitory rooms for orderlirwss and safety, and its authorit.v to do this dol'S not 
compromise a student's right to protection of thl~ [Fjourth [i\jnwndnwnt."). 
171. l'iazzola v. Watkins, 1·12 F.2d 28·1, 289 (5th Cir. Hl71). 
172. !d. 
17:l. !d. (footnote omitted); see also Smyth v. Lublll"'S, :l9K F. Supp. 777, 71-\K (W.D. 
1] PUBLIC EDUCATION AND STUDENT PRIVACY 59 
In other words, "authority granted for a limited purpose 
does not translate into a general authority to authorize a 
search." 174 Thus, while a student's signature on a housing 
agreement may constitute "consent to the [institution's] entry 
into [the student's] dorm room under" certain circumstances, 175 
it "cannot be reasonably construed as [the student] having 
given such consent to others." 176 
For example, in State u. Hunter, 177 the court concluded that 
a warrantless search conducted pursuant to a provision in the 
housing agreement was constitutional in light of, inter alia, the 
institution's "interest in maintaining a safe and proper 
educational environment .... "178 The student attended Utah 
State University, lived in a campus dormitory, and, like other 
dormitory residents, signed a residential agreement that 
provided, in relevant part, that: 
University officials reserve the right to enter and inspect 
residence hall rooms at any time. Inspections will occur when 
necessary to protect and maintain the property of the 
University, the health and safety of its students, or whenever 
necessary to aid in the basic responsibility of the University 
regarding discipline and maintenance of an educational 
atmosphere. In such cases effort will be made to notify the 
resident(s) in advance and to have the resident(s) present at 
the time of entry. 179 
After numerous incidents of vandalism and other problems 
on the second floor of the dormitory, which University officials 
attributed to violations of the institution's alcohol and 
explosives policies, the residents of that floor, including 
Hunter, were warned that further occurrences would result in 
Mich. 1975) ("[AJ blanket authorization in an adhesion contract that the College may 
search the room for violation of whatever substantive regulations the College chooses 
to adopt and pursuant to whatever search regulation the College chooses to adopt is 
not the type of focused, deliberate, and immediate consent contemplated hy the 
Constitution."). 
171. United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1011 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Warner. 81:i F.2d 401, 10:3 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a landlord who was authorized 
to enter property inhabited hy a tenant "for the limited purpose of making specified 
repairs and occasionally mowing the lawn" could not consent, on behalf of tenant, to a 
police search of premises). 
175. People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. ::ld S::ll, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
176. Jd. at 819-50. 
177. 831 P.2d 10:i:i (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
178. Jd. at 10:l8. 
179. Jd. at 10:31. 
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room-to-room inspections. 1xo Following additional violations, 
campus officials undertook a search of all rooms located on the 
second floor. IX! Because Hunter was not present when officials 
arrived to search his room, a passkey was used to gain entry. 1 X2 
Upon entering, stolen university property was discovered. un 
Ultimately, Hunter was charged with misdemeanor theft. U<4 He 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his room, 
which was granted, and the State appealed that decision. 1x5 
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted that 
"[t]he right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment does 
not include freedom from reasonable inspection of a school-
operated dormitory room by school officials." 1x6 Further, the 
court referred to the Supreme Court's recognition that "where 
state-operated educational institutions are involved ... [there 
is a] 'need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in 
the schools."' 1X7 In light of these overarching principles, the 
court concluded that the search was a "reasonable exercise of 
the university's authority to maintain an educational 
environment." 1xx "By signing the ... housing contract, Hunter 
agreed to the university's right of reasonable inspection and 
waived any Fourth Amendment objections to the university's 
exercise of that right." 1 x9 Additionally, this was "not a case in 
which university officials took action at the behest of or as part 
of a joint investigation with the police," 190 nor was it one in 
which "university officials attemptfed] to delegate their right to 
inspect rooms to the police, which would [have] result[edJ in 
the circumvention of traditional restrictions on police 
activity." 191 
180. /d.at10:l1. 
181. !d. at lO:l1-:lG. 




186. !d. (quoting Statl' v. Kappes, 550 1'.2d 121. 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 197fi)). 
11\7. !d. at 10:lG (quoting Ht,aly v .• James, 108 U.S. Hi9. 11\0 (1972)). 
1H8. !d. 
11\9. !d. at 1 O:l7. 
190. !d. 
191. !d. 
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Alternatively, in Devers v. Southern University, 192 the court 
affirmed a lower court's ruling that the institution's housing 
agreement was unconstitutional. Devers was a student at 
Southern University and A & M College, located in 
Louisiana. 193 As a condition of living in residential housing, he 
signed a rental agreement that provided, in pertinent part, 
that the "University reserves all rights in connection with 
assignments of rooms, inspection of rooms with police, and 
the termination of room occupancy." 194 During a dormitory 
search authorized by the institution's housing agreement, 
twelve bags of marijuana were found in Devers's room. 195 He 
was arrested, issued an administrative expulsion, and 
prohibited from entering classes. 196 Ultimately, Devers filed a 
civil lawsuit alleging his constitutional rights had been violated 
based upon the search of his dormitory room. 197 After a trial 
court found the dormitory search policy prima facie 
unconstitutional, the institution appealed. 198 
In support of the search's constitutionality, the University 
argued the safety of students justified the random dormitory 
searches, and that the regulation at issue was similar to that 
upheld by the court in Hunter. 199 However, this argument was 
unpersuasive, as the court distinguished the actions in this 
case from those in Hunter. First, "Hunter was not a case in 
which university officials took action at the behest of or as part 
of a joint investigation with the police."20° Further, the 
university officials in Hunter did not "attempt to delegate their 
right to inspect rooms to the police, which would result in 
circumvention of traditional restrictions on police activity."201 
Additionally, while the regulation in Hunter "specifically stated 
the purpose of its inspections [was] for maintenance of 
university property, the health and safety of students, and 
maintenance of discipline in an educational atmosphere,"202 
192. 712 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
19:l. /d. at 201. 
191. !d. at 204 (emphasis in original). 
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Southern University's regulation "[did] not specify such a 
purpose, rather it al1ow[ed] entry of dormitory rooms 
accompanied by police without any stated purpose." 203 ln light 
of these facts, the court rejected the University's appeal: 
The regulation utilized by Southern University clearly 
authorizes police involvement in the entry and search of the 
dormitory rooms. With police routinely assisting in the entry 
and search of a dormitory room, there are no factors which 
would characterize such an intrusion as a benign 
"administrative" search .... [A] check of a student's dormitory 
room is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless 
Southern University can show that the search furthers its 
functioning as an educational institution. Southern 
University's housing regulation, as written, clearly authorizes 
unconstitutional searches. The search must further an 
interest that is separate and distinct from that served by 
Louisiana's criminal laws. 204 
These cases provide a solid framework in which to analyze 
the issue of consent as it may be construed from the terms of a 
residential housing agreement. First, a student may not be 
forced to waive his or her constitutional rights as a condition of 
living in a dormitory. Second, the institution still retains the 
right to conduct appropriate health and safety inspections of 
dormitory rooms, so long as those searches further a legitimate 
educational interest of the institution. Third, where the search 
is performed in conjunction with law enforcement officials, or is 
designed to locate evidence of general criminal activity, it likely 
exceeds the scope of the consent given by the student through 
his or her signature on the housing contract. 
F. Uncovering Criminal Evidence During an Administrative 
Search 
While institution officials are permitted to carry out 
warrantless searches of dormitory rooms for administrative 
purposes, this raises a question that must be addressed: If a 
college or university official uncovers evidence of a crime, such 
as drugs or drug paraphernalia, during an authorized 
administrative search (e.g., for health and welfare), what steps 
should he or she take in response? 
2Cl:l. /d. 
201. /d. at 20(). 
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In Illinois v. McArthur, 205 the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of temporarily seizing an individual's "residence" in order 
to obtain a search warrant. The facts of the case are relatively 
straightforward: Police officers received a request from a 
woman to accompany her to the trailer she shared with her 
husband, Charles McArthur, so that she could collect her 
belongings without his interference.206 While the wife went 
inside to collect her possessions, the police remained outside.207 
After collecting her property, the wife spoke to one of the 
officers on the porch of the residence and informed him he 
should consider searching the trailer because her husband "had 
dope in there."208 She further stated that she had seen 
McArthur "slid[e] some dope underneath the couch."209 
Police sought permission to search the residence from 
McArthur, which was denied.210 At that point, one officer left 
the residence with the wife in order to procure a search 
warrant, while the second officer remained at the premises.211 
McArthur, who had exited the residence and was on the porch 
at this time, was notified that he would not be permitted tore-
enter the trailer without the police accompanying him.212 While 
McArthur entered the residence on two or three occasions to 
make telephone calls or get cigarettes, the officer remained just 
inside the door in order to observe McArthur's actions.213 A 
search warrant was obtained approximately two hours later, 
and the subsequent search turned up marijuana and assorted 
paraphernalia.214 
McArthur was charged with misdemeanor possession of 
drug paraphernalia and marijuana.215 He sought to suppress 
the evidence "on the ground that they were the 'fruit' of an 
unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter 
the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted 
205. 5:31 U.S. :J26, :l29 (2001). 
206. ld. at :J2H. 
207. !d. at :328-29. 




212. I d. 
21:3. /d. 
211. /d. 
215. I d. 
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him ... to 'have destroyed the marijuana."'216 The trial court 
granted McArthur's suppression motion, and the appellate 
court affirmed suppression of the evidence.217 The Supreme 
Court decided to hear the case in order to determine whether 
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the temporary seizure of a 
residence when probable cause exists to believe that evidence 
of a crime is located therein. 21 X 
Ultimately, the Court reversed the lower courts and found 
the seizure of McArthur's residence to be lawful. 219 After 
reiterating the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court outlined various exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, including "special law enforcement 
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, 
or the like .... "220 In this instance, the Court found the case 
involved a "plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law 
enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances."'221 Further, the 
Court noted that the "restraint at issue was tailored to that 
need, being limited in time and scope."222 The Court 
"balance[d] the privacy-related and law enforcement-related 
concerns" to determine whether the officers' conduct was 
reasonable. 223 
In conducting this balancing, the Court found the 
temporary seizure to be lawful for four reasons: first, the police 
had probable cause to believe evidence was located in the 
trailer based upon the wife's observations; second, it was 
reasonable for the police to assume that if McArthur was 
granted unfettered access to the trailer, he would destroy the 
drugs before a warrant could be obtained; third, the police 
actions in this instance (e.g., neither conducting a warrantless 
search nor arresting McArthur) demonstrated their efforts to 
"reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of 
personal privacy"; and fourth, the restraint was imposed only 
for the time necessary for reasonable police officers, acting with 
21(). !d. 
217. /d. at :l29-:l0. 
21il. /d.at:l:lO. 
2 HJ. !d. at :l:ll. 
220. Jcl. at :l:lO. 
221. !d. at :;:n (Pmphasis in original); sec also Unit(•d Stat(•s v. l'lacP, ·W2 U.S. ()~)(), 
701-02 (191-\:l). 
222. McArthur. 5:n U.S. at :l:ll. 
22:l. !d. 
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diligence, to obtain the search warrant.224 
The Court's holding in McArthur informs the appropriate 
actions to be taken in situations where institutional officials 
(e.g., Resident Assistants) uncover evidence of a crime during a 
routine administrative inspection of a dormitory room. If a 
Resident Assistant uncovers evidence of a crime, such as stolen 
property or other contraband, the prudent course is for the 
Resident Assistant to cease searching and notify campus law 
enforcement officials immediately of the discovery. Resident 
Assistants should be instructed that, while the discovery of 
contraband may be used to support probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant, it does not give them license to 
begin carrying out a general search of the room for additional 
evidence of criminal activity. Instead, the dormitory room 
should be secured immediately, and the evidence photographed 
and left in place. No resident of that room should thereafter be 
permitted to enter unless under law enforcement observation 
while issuance of a search warrant is pending. Law 
enforcement officers are within their rights to request consent 
to search from the individual whose room has been temporarily 
seized. However, if that request is denied, law enforcement 
officials must be diligent in attempting to procure a search 
warrant for the room in order to minimize the intrusion into 
the student's personal privacy. 
VI. PLAIN VIEW 
"It is well established that under certain circumstances the 
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant."225 
In order to justify a seizure under the "plain view" doctrine, 
three requirements must be met: first, a law enforcement 
officer must lawfully be in a position to observe the item to be 
seized; second, the incriminating nature of the item must be 
immediately apparent; and third, the officer must have a 
"lawful right of access to the object itself."226 
A. Lawful Position to Observe 
With regard to the first requirement, a law enforcement 
224. ld. at :3:31-:3:3. 
225. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 40il U.S. 443, 465 (1971). 
226. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 1:35-37 (1990). 
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officer may be lawfully present to make the observation of the 
evidence or contraband either because he or she has a valid 
search or arrest warrant227 or because an exception to the 
warrant requirement is present, such as when the search IS 
conducted pursuant to the terms of a housing agreement. 22x 
B. Incriminating Nature Immediately Apparent 
In addition to a lawful vantage point, the "incriminating 
nature" of the item must also be "immediately apparent."229 An 
item's incriminating character is "immediately apparent" if a 
law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the item 
is subject to seizure. 23° Courts use a variety of methods to 
determine whether an item's "incriminating nature" was 
"immediately apparent," including, for example: 
(1) the nexus between the seized object and the items 
particularized in the warrant; (2) whether the intrinsic nature 
or appearance of the seized object gives probable cause to 
associate it with criminal activity; and (:3) whether probable 
cause IS the direct result of the executing officer's 
227. !d. at 1 :i5 ('"An example of the applicability of thP 'plain view" doctritw is tlw 
situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for RJwcified objects. 
and in tlw course of tht~ st~arch conw across some other articlt~ of incriminating 
charactc•r."): United States v. Heinholz, 215 F.:ld 765. 777 (Hth Cir. 2001) (holding that 
off\cers t•xecuting a search warrant wt~n~ lawfully on premises): United Statl's v. 
Hamil', 1()5 F.:ld HO, H2 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that officers wen• lawfully on pn•mist•s 
becausl' tlwy "had a valid warrant to search the premises"); UnitPd States v. Munoz. 
150 F.:ld 101, 111 (6th Cir. 199H) (holding that a plain vil•w sPizun• was pl'rmissiblt• 
during execution of arrest warrant); United States v. Calloway, 1 ](i l<'.:Jd 1129. 1 J:l:l 
(fith Cir. 1 ~)97) (holding that a plain view seizun~ was permissihlt~ where officers Wl'l'l' 
pn•st~nt because thl'y "were t~xc~cuting a valid search warrant"). 
22H. Horton, 19() U.S. at 1:lfi ("'WherP tht~ initial intrusion that brings tlw polict• 
within plain viPw of such an article is supported, not by a warrant. but by mw of tlw 
n•cognized exceptions to tlw wanant requin,mPnt, the spizun• is also legitimate."): 
United Statps v. Heed, H1 F.:ld fi·H. fi19 (()th Cir. Hl91-1); Unitl'd States v .. Jackson. J:l1 
F.:ld 1105, 1109 ( 1th Cir. 1997) (noting that when "an offlcl~r·s pn~sPnce in a rl'sidl•nct• 
is justified by any n~cognized pxception to the warrant rcquireml'nt. including 
consc~nt, lw may seize• incriminating evidt~ncl' that is in his plain viPw''). 
229. Horton, ~~Hi U.S. at 1 :lfi (holding that "not only must. tlw itt~m he in plain 
view: its incriminating character must also be 'immPdiatuly appan•nt'") (citation 
omitted). 
2:l0. Arizona v. !licks. '1?l0 U.S. :l21. :l2fi (19?l7) ("We haw not rulPd on thP 
question whether probablt, cause is required in ordPr to invoke the 'plain vit~w· doct.ritw . 
. . . We now hold that probablP causP is rPquin•tl."); Minrwsota v. Dickl•rson, :)01-\ U.S. 
:HiG, :l75 (199:l) ("If ... tlw poliCl~ lack probable eausl~ to bdiPw that an objl'ct in plain 
vic~w is contraband without conducting some furtht~r search of the object ... the plain-
vil'w doctrine cannot justify its sL~izmc."); Texas v. Brown. ~()() U.S. 7:l0. 7:lH (19H:l) 
(holding that a plain view scizun• is "prpsumptively reasonable. assuming that thl're is 
prohahlP caust~ to associate the propnty with criminal activity'') (citation omittt·d). 
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instantaneous sensory perceptions. 231 
C. Lawful Right of Access 
In addition to the above requirements, for the plain view 
doctrine to apply, an officer "must also have a lawful right of 
access to the object itsel£."232 As noted by the Supreme Court: 
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating 
object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may 
establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But 
even where the object is contraband, this Court has 
repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police 
may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.233 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Neilson, a student lived 
in a dormitory suite, comprised of four bedrooms, at Fitchburg 
State College, a public institution. 234 As part of his housing 
agreement, Neilson signed a document that stated, inter alia, 
that "[r]esidence life staff members will enter student rooms to 
inspect for hazards to health or personal safety."235 When a 
maintenance worker overheard a cat inside Neilson's dormitory 
suite, he informed college officials, who notified one of the 
residents of the suite (not Neilson) that "any cat must be 
removed pursuant to the college's health and safety 
regulations."236 Notice was also posted on all four bedroom 
doors that a "door to door" check would be conducted later that 
evening in order to ensure the cat had been removed.237 
Neilson was not present for the later search of his room. 238 
However, "[w]hile searching the defendant's bedroom, the 
officials noticed a light emanating from the closet. The officials, 
fearing a fire hazard, opened the closet door. There, they 
discovered two four-foot tall [marijuana] plants, along with 
lights, fertilizer, and numerous other materials for [marijuana] 
cultivation and use."239 
Following this discovery, the campus police department was 
2:n. United States v. Calloway, 116 F.:Jd 1129, 11 :Ja (6th Cir. 1997). 
2:l2. Horton, 196 U.S. at 1:37. 
2:l:l. /d. at 1 ;)7 n. 7 (citations omitted). 
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called.240 Upon arrival, the officers entered Neilson's room, 
observed the marijuana plants, took photographs of them, and 
then seized them as evidence.241 At his trial, the student moved 
to suppress all of the evidence seized based on a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights. 242 The trial court agreed, and the 
government appealed the judge's ruling.243 The court concluded 
that Neilson "consented to reasonable searches to enforce the 
college's health and safety regulations when he signed the 
residence contract," and that the "hunt for the elusive feline fit 
within the scope of that consent."244 The court further reasoned 
that "when the college officials opened the closet door they were 
reasonably concerned about health and safety."245 Thus, the 
court held that the initial search was reasonable "because it 
was intended to enforce a legitimate health and safety rule that 
related to the college's function as an educational 
institution."246 
However, this did not end the court's inquiry, because "the 
crux of the defendant's argument [wasl that [a] constitutional 
violation occurred when the campus police searched the room 
and seized evidence"247 without either a search warrant or an 
exception to the warrant requirement. In holding the search 
unconstitutional, the court noted the officers entered the 
dormitory room "without a warrant, consent, or exigent 
circumstances."24x In light of this, the court held the plain view 
doctrine did not apply in this instance, because "the officers 
were not lawfully present in the dormitory room when they 
made their plain view observations."249 
The plain view doctrine would only have justified the 
officers' observations of the marijuana if the entry into the 
room had been made pursuant to a lawful justification (e.g., 
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VII. SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
A search incident to a lawful custodial arrest "is not only an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that 
Amendment."250 Searches incident to a lawful arrest are 
permitted for three reasons: (a) to discover weapons on the 
arrestee or in the area "within his immediate control;" (b) to 
prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence; and (c) to 
discover any instruments the arrestee may use to escape.251 
The phrase "within his immediate control" has been construed 
"to mean the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence,"252 a limitation 
"which continues to define the boundaries of the exception."253 
In order to have a valid search incident to arrest, two 
requirements must be met. First, there must be an actual 
arrest supported by probable cause, as opposed to some lesser 
form of detention;254 second, the search must be "substantially 
contemporaneous" with the arrest. 255 Whether a search was 
conducted "substantially contemporaneous" with the arrest is a 
fact-specific determination that focuses on various factors, 
250. United States v. Robinson, 111 U.S. 218,2:35 (197:3). 
251. Chime! v. California, :395 U.S. 752, 762-6:3 (1969); Arizona v. Cant, 129 S. Ct. 
1710, 1716 (2009) ("The [search incident to arrest] exception derives from interests in 
officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest 
situations."); Robinson, 111 U.S. at 2:31 ("The justification or reason for the authority to 
search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect 
in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his 
person for later use at trial."); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974) 
(explaining that the search incident to arrest exception "has traditionally been justifiL'd 
by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of 
crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained"); Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20, :10 (1925) ("The right without a search warrant 
contemporanPously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to 
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected 
with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as 
wc•apons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted."). 
252. Chimel, ;395 U.S. at 76:1. 
25:3. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716. 
254. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 11:J, 118-19 (1998) (holding that the search incident 
to arn,st exception was a "bright-line" rule that was not extended to situations in which 
an arrest was not effected). 
255. New York v. Belton, 15:1 U.S. 151,165 (1981), abrogated in part by Gant, 129 
S. Ct. 172:3; Preston v. United States, :l76 U.S. i164, :367-68 (1964), overruled in part by 
United StatL's v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); Stoner v. California, :n6 U.S. 18:1, 186 
(1961). 
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including where the search was conducted;25 (' when the search 
was conducted in relation to the arrest; 257 and whether the 
defendant was present at the scene of the arrest during the 
search. 25 X Generally speaking, a search will likely be 
considered to have been "substantially contemporaneous" with 
the arrest as long as the administrative processes incident to 
the arrest and custody have not been completed at the time the 
search occurs. 259 Finally, it is possible that the search could 
take place prior to the arrest, subject to certain conditions. 260 
As noted, the scope of a search incident to arrest includes 
not only the arrestee's person, but also the area "within his 
immediate control."261 The area under an individual's 
"immediate control" is determined at the time of the arrest, and 
not at the time the search is conducted. 262 The rule is the same 
regardless of whether the arrest occurs in a residence, on the 
street, or in a vehicle. 263 Further, the area within an 
individual's immediate control would include containers within 
the arrestee's immediate control at the time of the arrest, such 
as backpacks or briefcases.264 
25G. Sec, e.g., Holmes v. Kucynda, :l21 F.:ld 1 OG9, !OK2 (11th Cir. 200:l) (explaining 
that tlw t)Xception "places a tempot'al and a spatial limitation on scardws incident to 
arwst ... ")(quoting Belton, ~5:l U.S. at '165). 
2"l7. See, e.g.. United States v. Sanchez, 555 F.:ld 910. 922 (lOth Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a search of an arrcstl'P occurn'd "promptly after his arrest, and can n•adil:-· bt• 
characteriz<'d as 'substantially contemporanemls."'), ccrl. denied. 129 S. Ct. J()fi7 
(2009). 
258. See, e.g. United States v. Finley, 177 F.:ld 250, 2f)() (flth Cir. 2007) (upholding 
a Sl'arch incitknt to arrest <'Vl'll though it occulTed aftt•r tlw dtd'etHiant lwd het•n 
transported from scl'nt' of arrest). 
21)~). Sec United States v. lluigonwz. 702 F.2d ()!,()()(5th Cir. HJK:l) (citing Unit<od 
States v. Edwards, ,115 U.S. KOO, SO~ (197~)). 
2fi0. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 118 U.S. 9K. 111 (19KO) (holding that polict• wt•n• 
entitled to scm·ch pPtitiorwr hefon· art'l'sting him, as he already admittt•d to owning a 
large amount of drugs found in someon<' else's purst>). 
2G1. Chime•] v. California. :l95 U.S. 7G2, 7fi2-fi:l (19f19); see also United Stall's v. 
Robinson. ·111 U.S. 21 K. 2:l5 (197:l). 
2G2. in re Sua led Cast• 9G-:ll G7, 15:l F.:ld 7fi9. 7()7 (D.C. Cir. HJ9K) ("Tiw critical 
timl' for analysis, however, is the tinw of the aJ'J'cst and not tht• timl' of the sl'an:h."). 
2G:l. ld. at 7G7- 7K (explaining that the rule dol's not change bast•d on tlw location 
of tlw arn,st). 
261. See, e.g., Unitt"! States v. Donm•s, 9·17 F2.d 11:l0. J.1:l7 (lOth Cir. HJ91) ("[AJ 
search incidl'nt to a lawful arrest pl'rmits a law enforct·nwnt officl'r to conduct a 
warrantless search of a container located in thl' area of thl' arn•stt•e's imnwdiate 
control."). See also United Stateo v. Uricoccht•a-Casallas, 91{) F.2d lfi2. lfifi (1st Cir. 
1991) (walll't); United Statl's v. Tavolacci. K9fl F.2d H2:l, J.12K-29 (D.C. Cir. HJ90) 
(locked suitcasl'); United States v. Swann. 1-19 F.:ld 271, 27:l (1th Cir. HHJK) (film 
canistPr); UnitPd States v. Ivy, 97:1 F.2d 118,1, 11K7 (5th Cir. 1992) (brid(:a;;l'): Unitt•d 
Statl's v. !{ichardson. 121 F.:ld 10:)1, 10Gfi (7th Cir. 1997) (shaving hag); United Statl's 
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Because dormitories have been found to be analogous to 
other residential settings (e.g., apartments, motels, and hotels), 
additional aspects of how the law regarding searches incident 
to arrest might be applied within those types of buildings is 
appropriate. First of all, it should be noted that when an arrest 
occurs inside a residence, the law "does not permit the 
arresting officers to lead the accused from place to place and 
use his presence in each location to justify a 'search incident to 
the arrest."'265 Further, where an arrest occurs outside of a 
residence, it is not typically permissible to enter the residence 
itsel£.266 As noted by the Supreme Court: 
The Constitution has never been construed by this Court to 
allow the police, in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a 
person outside his home and then take him inside for the 
purpose of conducting a warrantless search. On the contrary, 
"it has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully 
be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident 
to a lawful arrest therein."267 
However, some courts have carved out an exception to this 
general rule, and have permitted law enforcement officers to 
accompany an arrestee into his or her residence in order to 
obtain clothing or identification.268 For example, in Chrisman, 
v. Oakley, 15:ll<'.:ld 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1998) (backpack). 
265. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 198:1) (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
266. Sec, e.!{., ,James v. Louisiana, :182 U.S. 36, :11 (1965) (holding that a 
warrantless search of a home after the defendant was arrested two blocks away was 
unconstitutional) (citation omitted); United States v. Varner, 481 F.3d 569, 571 (8th 
Cir. 2007) ("Ordinarily, the arrest of a person outside of a residence does not justify a 
warrantless search of the residence itself.") (citation omitted). 
267. Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 820 (1969) (citation and quotation 
omitted). 
268. Cf. Varner, 181 F.:1d at 571-72 ("One of the exceptions to this rule, however, is 
when an officer accompanies the arrestee into his residence .... Even absent an 
affirmative indication that the arrestee might have a weapon available . . . the 
arresting officer has authority to maintain custody over the arrestee and to remain 
literally at the arn,stee's elbow at all times.") (citation omitted); United States v. 
Wilson, :l06 F.3d 2:l1, 241 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (holding that "the potential of a 
personal safety hazard to the arrestee places a duty on law enforcement officers to 
obtain appropriate clothing .... ") overruled in part, United States v. Gould, :l64 F.ild 
578 (5th Cir. 20lH); United States v. Gwinn, 219 F.3d 326, :133 (4th Cir. 2000) (officers 
n•-entered trailer to get shirt and hoots for arrestee); United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 
619, 620-21 (10th Cir. 1992) (officers accompanied arrestee hack inside trailer to get 
shoes); United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1091, 1101 (2d Cir. 1977) (officer 
accompanied arrestee, who was wearing only a nightgown and bathrobe, to get 
dressed), with United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding 
entry unlawful absent a "specific request or consent.") (citation and quotation omitted); 
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a campus police officer at Washington State University placed 
a college student under arrest and accompanied him to his 
dormitory room, where the student wished to go to obtain his 
identification.269 Initially, the student entered, while the officer 
remained in the open doorway_27° However, according to the 
Court: 
Within :30 to 45 seconds after [the arrestee] entered the room, 
the officer noticed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk 8 to 
10 feet from where he was standing. From his training and 
experience, the officer believed the seeds were [marijuana] 
and the pipe was of a type used to smoke [marijuana]. He 
entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds, 
confirming that the seeds were [marijuana] and observing 
that the pipe smelled of [marijuana].:m 
The student was charged with possession of controlled 
substances, and attempted to have the evidence suppressed by 
claiming the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
entering the dormitory room without a search warrant. 272 The 
student's motion was denied, and he was subsequently 
convicted.273 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of 
Washington reversed the conviction, holding the campus police 
officer's warrantless entry into the room to be unconstitutional 
and rendering the seizure of the evidence impermissible.274 The 
case was ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. 275 
In reversing the Supreme Court of Washington, the Court 
concluded that the campus police officer's actions had been 
lawful, since once the officer had arrested the student, he was 
"authorized to accompany him to his room for the purpose of 
obtaining identification."276 The Court held that ''ltJhe officer 
had a right to remain literally at [the arrestee's] elbow at all 
United States v. Kinm•:-·. G:lH F.2d 911, 91:) (()th Cir. HJ81) (entry impermissihlP whPrP 
"tlw defendant did not reqtwst pl'rmission to secun• mlditional dothing and did not 
consent to an entry of his hmnP."). 
269. Washington v. Chrisman, :155 U.S. 1. :1 (19H2). 
270. !d. 
271. !d. at '1. 
272. !d. 
27:1. !d. 
27,1. !d. at 5. 
27fl. !d. 
27fi. !d. at fi (footnote omitted). 
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times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is to the contrary."277 
Further, "the officer's need to ensure his own safety-as well as 
the integrity of the arrest-[were] compelling."278 According to 
the Court: 
Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to 
the arresting officer .... There is no way for an officer to 
predict reliably how a particular subject will react to arrest or 
the degree of the potential danger. Moreover, the possibility 
that an arrested person will attempt to escape if not properly 
supervised is obvious. Although the Supreme Court of 
Washington found little likelihood that [the arrestee] could 
escape from his dormitory room, an arresting officer's 
custodial authority over an arrested person does not depend 
upon a reviewing court's after-the-fact assessment of the 
particular arrest situation. 279 
Therefore, the Court found that it was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment "for a police officer, as a matter of routine, 
to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his 
judgment dictates, following the arrest."280 In this instance, the 
officer was lawfully present in the room, so his plain view 
observations of the narcotics and associated paraphernalia was 
appropriate. 
VIII. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
"The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to 
delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely 
endanger their lives or the lives of others."281 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court recognizes that "exigent circumstances" 
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. 282 Courts 
define "exigent circumstances" in various ways, such as "those 
circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that entry ... was necessary to prevent physical harm to the 
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, 
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
277. /d. 
278. !d. at 7. 
279. !d. (citations omitted). 
280. /d. 
281. Warden v. Hayden, ;~87 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1967). 
282. Michigan v. Tylt~r. 1:)6 U.S. 199, 509 (1978) ("[AJ warrantless entry by 
criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is compelling need for 
official action and no time to secure a warrant."). 
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improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."2K-' 
The government bears the burden of proving that "exigent 
circumstances" existed to justify the warrantless search, 2x4 and 
must establish that (a) probable cause existed, and (b) that an 
exigency existed. 2X5 
The case of State v. Ellis2x6 demonstrates how both the 
plain view doctrine and the exigent circumstances exception 
have been applied in a dormitory setting. Ellis was a student at 
Central State University and lived in a campus dormitory. 2x7 
As with others living in residential housing, he "had agreed to 
recognize and be subject to the safety and security policies and 
procedures while a resident on the campus .... "2xx Safety 
inspections were conducted on a routine basis, and "were not 
performed for the purpose of obtaining evidence solely for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution."2x9 During one such inspection 
of Ellis' room, two Resident Assistants observed marijuana in 
an open drawer. 29° Campus police officers were notified and 
arrived at the room while the inspection was ongoing. 291 While 
the officers were present in the room, they did not participate 
in the search. 292 According to the court: 
Police remained inside Defendant's room and observed while 
the Resident Assistants continued their search. After the 
Resident Assistants had completed their search and placed 
the contraband they discovered in a central location in the 
room. as the officers had directed, the police then seized and 
2H:l. United States v. McConney. 72H F.2d 119G, 1199 (9th Cir. 19H·1) (en bane): see 
also Ewolski v. City of Brunswick. 2H7 F.:ld 192, :101 (fith Cir. 2002) ("Exigent 
circumstances exist wlwrl' then~ arc• ·n,al imnwdiatl' and sl'rious consl'qur•m·r•s' that 
would certainly occur were a police officer to postpmw action to gd a warrant.") 
(intr,rnal citations and brackuts omittr,rl). 
2H1. United States v .• Jdfers, :H2 U.S. 1H, 51 (19GI). 
285. Sec Unitr•d States v. Tobin, 92:l F.2d lGOG, 1:)10 (11th Cir. lmJl) (''i\ 
warrantlr,ss search is allowed, howr'Vl'r, whr,rr• both probahh' causp and r•xigpnt 
circumstances exist."); United Statr's v. Lindst>y, 877 F.2d 777, 7HO (9th Cir. 19il9) (For 
valid cl:1im of exigent circumstancl's. thl' burden is on thl' govr,rnnwnt to dr·monstrate 
that: (1) the police had pt·obable causP to sParch tlw def(•n<lant's apartnwnt: and (2) 
r'xigcnt circumstances excused the lack of a warrant.). 
286. 2006 Ohio 1 fiHH (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
287. /d. at ,]7. 
288. /d. 
2H9. !d. at ,I H. 
2~10. /d. at ']9. 
291. !d. at '110. 
2~12. /d. 
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removed that contraband from Defendant's room. 293 
Ellis was indicted and convicted on one count of trafficking 
marijuana based upon the drugs seized during the search of his 
dormitory room. 294 He was sentenced to five years of 
community control sanctions and a $250 fine. 295 On appeal, 
Ellis claimed the marijuana seized from his room should have 
been suppressed due to a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights.296 
The court addressed Ellis' contention that the safety 
inspection conducted by the Resident Assistants was 
impermissible and did not fall within the administrative 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Starting from the premise 
that the Fourth Amendment "limits only official government 
behavior or state action,"297 the court noted that the "mere fact 
that evidence found and obtained during a search by a private 
person is ultimately turned over to the police does not destroy 
the private nature of the search .... "298 Instead, it is only 
when "a private person acts as the agent of the police ... [that] 
the result is different."299 Thus, "[o]fficial participation in the 
planning or implementation of a private person's efforts to 
secure evidence may taint the operation sufficiently as to 
require suppression of the evidence."300 In this instance, the 
court concluded that "the search the Resident Life staff 
performed which yielded the marijuana that campus police 
seized was an administrative search by private persons, and 
therefore not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement."301 
However, this did not dispose of the matter, since Ellis 
raised a second issue that required the court's attention. 
Specifically, he argued that the campus police entry into his 
room and the subsequent seizure of the marijuana was 
unconstitutional. 302 After consideration of the issue, the court 
:w:1. /d.at,l17. 
291. /d. at ~2. 
295. /d. 
296. ld. at ~:1. 




::501. !d. at ,115. 
:l02. Jd. at ,116. 
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agreed that when the campus police officers entered Ellis' 
dormitory room, they infringed upon an area where he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 303 Consequently, the campus 
police needed either a search warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement in order to lawfully enter Ellis' room, and 
because they had neither, the entry into the room was 
illegal. 304 Therefore, the plain view exception did not apply 
because the police were not lawfully in a position to observe the 
marijuana: "The plain view exception ldid] not apply because 
police did not observe the contraband until after they had 
unlawfully entered Defendant's room, and any intrusion 
affording the plain view observation must otherwise be 
lawfu1."305 
Finally, the court found the officers' entry could not he 
justified under the exigent circumstances exception, because 
there was no possibility of the evidence being concealed by Ellis 
at that point, nor was there any realistic possibility the 
evidence would be destroyed. 30(' lnstead, the court concluded 
that the "Resident Assistants were in the room, [the] 
Defendant was not, and [theJ Defendant could have easily been 
kept out of the room by police and the evidence preserved until 
police had secured a warrant."307 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
dormitory room. In light of that, administrators at public 
universities must comply with the Fourth Amendment when 
conducting searches of those rooms. Because of the institution's 
responsibility to provide a safe educational environment, 
reasonable health and safety inspections of dormitory rooms 
are generally permitted under the terms and agreements of a 
student housing agreement. Such agreements will not, 
however, support general searches by campus officials to locate 
:lO:l. /d. at •118 ("By entering Defendant's dormitory room, campus police infringed 
upon the reasonable l'XJwctation of privacy that Dd'endant had in that place which . 
is c•ntitled to the same levcd of protection against unreasonablP search and seizur·c· as a 
private home.''). 
:l01. /d. at ~120. 
:305. /d. at ~11 ~l. (footnote omitted). 
:JO(). /d. ("Neitlwr d<ws the exigcmt or enwrgency eir·cmnstances c·xception just if\· 
the entry. for instance to pn'vl'nt the concl'alment or destruction of evidl'nCl'."). 
:w1. Id. 
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evidence of criminal activity, even where the institution's 
interest are significant. JOR In fact, overly broad wording in such 
agreements has been found to be an unconstitutional attempt 
to coerce a student into waiving his or her Fourth Amendment 
rights. Finally, there are a variety of exceptions to the search 
warrant requirement that may be utilized to support a search 
of a student's dormitory room. Each has requirements specific 
to the exception that must be met in order for any subsequent 
search to be constitutionally permissible. 
808. Smyth v. Lubbers, :l98 F. Supp. 777, 790 (W.D. Mich. 1975) ("While the 
College has an important interest in enforcing drug laws and regulations, and a duty to 
do so, it does not have such special characteristics or such a compelling interest as to 
justify setting aside the usual rights of privacy enjoyed by adults."). 
